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Essays on the Economics of Climate Change
Abstract
This dissertation studies three aspects of the economics of climate change: how
rising sea levels will affect coastal homeowners in Florida; how changes in weather will
affect the prevalence of crime in the United States; and why skepticism about climate
change is so common among the general public.
Chapter 1 uses housing market data to estimate the welfare costs of shoreline
loss along coastal beaches in Florida. I develop a structural housing market model and
use it to provide a welfare interpretation for the coefficients from a new “discontinuity
matching” hedonic research design. Using housing sales data, beach width surveys,
and historical beach nourishment records, I then estimate Florida homeowners’ will-
ingness to pay for an extra foot of sand. I find that changes in beach width have little
impact on housing prices, except possibly at very eroded beaches.
Chapter 2 estimates the impact of climate change on the prevalence of crimi-
nal activity in the United States. The analysis is based on monthly crime and weather
data for 2,972 U.S. counties from 1960 to 2009. The results show that temperature has
a strong positive effect on criminal behavior, and that between 2010 and 2099, climate
change will cause an additional 35,000 murders, 216,000 cases of rape, 1.6 million ag-
gravated assaults, 2.4 million simple assaults, 409,000 robberies, 3.1 million burglaries,
3.8 million cases of larceny, and 1.4 million cases of vehicle theft. The social cost of
these climate-related crimes is between 20 and 68 billion dollars.
Chapter 3 develops a model of rational skepticism about policy-relevant sci-
entific questions. Many policy debates have three features: first, individuals initially
iii
disagree about some scientific question; second, new evidence about the question be-
comes available; and third, the evidence may be systematically biased. Under these
conditions, Bayesian disagreements persist even in the face of an infinite quantity of
new evidence. Furthermore, Bayesian updating based on the new evidence produces
“skeptics”, in the sense that individuals whose prior beliefs conflict most with the ob-
servable evidence end up with the most extreme posterior beliefs about the degree of
bias. These results provide insight into the phenomenon of climate skepticism.
iv
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Introduction
In the absence of concerted action by the world’s governments, anthropogenic green-
house gas emissions will cause global temperatures to increase between 3 and 8 de-
grees Fahrenheit over the next century. At the same time, precipitation patterns will
change, snow cover will decrease, sea levels will rise, and a variety of other climatic
shifts will take place (IPCC, 2007). Developing rational public policies to address these
changes will require researchers to develop credible estimates of the economic impacts
of climate change and to communicate this technical knowledge to policy makers and
the general public. This dissertation contributes to both of these goals.
Chapter 1 of the dissertation uses housing market data to estimate the welfare costs of
shoreline loss along coastal beaches in Florida. In this chapter, I develop a forward-
looking structural model of a housing market in which a time-variant housing charac-
teristic (beach width) follows a Markov process. I use this model to provide an exact
welfare interpretation for the coefficients from a new “discontinuity matching” hedo-
nic research design. Using a unique panel dataset on housing sales, beach width sur-
vey measurements, and the timing of 204 beach nourishment projects along 300 miles
of Florida’s coastline, I then estimate homeowners’ willingness to pay for an extra foot
of sand. In contrast to previous work, I find that changes in beach width have little
impact on housing prices, except possibly at very eroded beaches. The results imply
that the welfare costs of sea level rise may be low up to a threshold, and then increase
sharply.
Chapter 2 estimates the impact of climate change on the prevalence of criminal activity
in the United States. The analysis is based on a panel of monthly crime, temperature,
and precipitation data for 2,972 U.S. counties over the 50-year period from 1960 to
2009. I identify the effect of weather on monthly crime by using a semi-parametric
bin estimator and controlling for county-by-month and county-by-year fixed effects.
The results show that temperature has a strong positive effect on criminal behavior,
with little evidence of lagged impacts. Under the IPCC’s A1B climate scenario, the
United States will experience an additional 35,000 murders, 216,000 cases of rape, 1.6
xi
million aggravated assaults, 2.4 million simple assaults, 409,000 robberies, 3.1 million
burglaries, 3.8 million cases of larceny, and 1.4 million cases of vehicle theft, compared
to the total number of offenses that would have occurred between the years 2010 and
2099 in the absence of climate change. The present discounted value of the social costs
of these climate-related crimes is between 20 and 68 billion dollars.
As a complement to Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 explores how people learn about
policy-relevant scientific questions. Many public policy debates have three features:
first, individuals initially disagree about some core scientific question; second, new
evidence about the question becomes available over time; and third, there is some pos-
sibility that the evidence is systematically biased. I show that under these conditions,
Bayesian disagreements persist even in the face of an infinite quantity of new evidence.
Furthermore, Bayesian updating based on the new evidence produces “skeptics”, in
the sense that individuals whose prior beliefs conflict most with the observable evi-
dence end up with the most extreme posterior beliefs about the degree of bias. These
results explain why skepticism about the quality of climate science is most prevalent
among people who believe that climate change is unlikely to occur.
As the abstracts above illustrate, there are a variety of themes that cut across the chap-
ters of this dissertation. In this introduction, I reflect on these themes, as well as a
broader question: why has it been so difficult to learn about the economic impacts of
climate change? I consider several main challenges.
Perhaps the most central difficulty is that economic climate change research involves—
in an unescapable, fundamental way—out-of-sample prediction. Although economists
are frequently forced to make policy recommendations based on limited data, the de-
gree of extrapolation required for climate change is enormous. An eight degree F in-
crease in global temperatures is completely outside the realm of historical experience:
there are no recent global-wide warming episodes of a similar magnitude on which to
base economic impact estimates. In the absence of such data, economists have relied
on three main categories of methodologies to predict the impacts of climate change on
economic outcomes: a production function approach (e.g., Adams et al, 1988; Rosen-
zweig and Parry, 1994), a cross-sectional “Ricardian” approach based on differences
xii
in climate across locations (e.g., Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw, 1994; Cragg and
Kahn, 1997), and a panel approach based on differences in weather over time in a par-
ticular location (e.g., Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007, 2011; Schlenker and Roberts,
2009; Dell, Jones, and Olken, forthcoming; and Chapters 1 and 2 of this paper). Each
approach has strengths and weaknesses.
The strength of the production function approach is its simplicity and modest data re-
quirements. This methodology is based on scientific estimates of the impact of temper-
atures and precipitation on output from a particular economic activity. For example, to
determine how climate change is likely to affect wheat, corn, and soybean production
in the Western United States, Adams et al (1988) rely on agricultural science models
that describe how growing season temperatures affect the productivity of each type
of plant. Because this information is relatively easy to collect (e.g., by studying plants
grown under experimentally-controlled greenhouse conditions), the production func-
tion methodology provides a straightforward approach for estimating climate change
impacts. One weakness, however, is that it fails to account for short-run and long-
run margins for adaptation. For example, in the face of drier than normal conditions,
farmers might adjust irrigation practices, plant a different mix of crops, or—in the very
long run—convert their agricultural land to some other use. Because these opportu-
nities for adaptation reduce the costs of changes in climate, the production function
approach will typically overestimate the direct impact of climate change. A second
weakness is that this approach does not account for partial and general equilibrium
market responses. For example, in years with below average agricultural production,
crop prices tend to rise, thus changing the distribution of impacts and incentives across
the economy.
An alternative to the production function approach is the cross-sectional “Ricardian”
approach proposed by Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994), which is based on
analysis of differences in economic outcomes across geographic areas with different
climates. Relative to the production function approach, the key advantage of the cross-
sectional approach is that it provides a method for estimating the long-run effects of
climate on economic outcomes. Under the reasonable assumption that people are likely
to choose factors of production that are best suited to their local climate, a regression of
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economic outcomes on climate will produce estimates that reflect the long-run relation-
ship between climate and economic outcomes. For example, Mendelsohn, Nordhaus,
and Shaw (1994) use data on farmland prices and average temperatures and precip-
itation to estimate the welfare impacts of climate change on agricultural areas of the
United States. However, although the use of cross-sectional data does address some
concerns about adaptation, it also a weakness. Because there are many other environ-
mental and economic factors—soil type, proximity to the coast, availability of mineral
resources, historical settlement patterns—that are correlated with climate, it is possible
for cross-sectional regressions to be biased by correlated unobservables. In some con-
texts, such as agriculture, it seems at least possible to control for the most important
variables that affect the outcomes of interest. However, in other contexts, such as resi-
dential demand for climate, controlling for all relevant locational characteristics seems
less realistic.
A third methodology that has been used to estimate the economic impacts of climate
change is a panel approach based on differences in weather over time in a particular
location. The advantage of this approach is that it controls for idiosyncratic differences
across locations while exploiting presumably random variation in weather over time
within each location. As a result, regressions based on this approach include a larger
number of data points and thus provide a higher degree of precision. More impor-
tantly, when used with fixed effects methods, this panel approach controls for perma-
nent unobservable characteristics that may otherwise bias estimates of the impacts of
climate change. However, this methodology also has a serious drawback: individuals’
and firms’ responses to short-term variation in weather are likely to be quite different
from their responses to longer-term changes in climate. Thus, although this approach
can better account for short-term adaptation than the production function method, it
still may not produce very accurate estimates of long-run impacts.
In addition to the difficulties created by the absence of relevant historical experience
with changing climate, economic climate change research must also grapple with a
second major challenge: the fact that the greatest changes in climate will occur in the
distant future. The fact that large temperature increases may not occur for a century
or more raises a variety of issues (see, e.g., Weitzman, 1998; Nordhaus, 2007; Weitz-
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man, 2007; Wagner and Zeckhauser, 2011). Some of these relate the deep scientific
and economic uncertanties that arise over long time periods. Can impact estimates
based on recent experience be extrapolated to predict economic outcomes a hundred
years from now? If so, what assumptions should be made about the baseline growth
rate of economic activity and technological progress? Will the passage of time create
new, unforseen opportunities for adaptation? Other issues relate to the challenges that
long time periods create for framing economic analysis. What discount rate should
be used to compare costs and benefits incurred in the present and the distant future,
and should this discount rate include ethical considerations? What empirical evidence
could shed light on the welfare impacts of extreme changes in climate that—with non-
zero probability—might occur? How should these low-probability disasters enter into
current cost-benefit calculations? In answering these questions, it is important to be
mindful of the poor historical record of attempts to predict far into the future. As I
argue in Chapter 2, these uncertanties about the distant future imply that even a care-
fully constructed analysis of long-term climate impacts is—in a very real sense—little
better than an extended “back-of-the-envelope” calculation.
A third set of issues related to estimating the economic impacts of climate change stems
from the possibility that marginal impacts are likely to be heterogeneus and nonlinear.
For example, although Chapter 1 of this dissertation suggests that the near-term wel-
fare impacts of rising sea levels are not statistically distinguishable from zero, Chapter
2 provides striking evidence that climate change will cause significant changes in crime
patterns across the United States. There is also heterogeneity in climate change impacts
across different geographic areas: as Chapter 2 demonstrates, the social costs of future
climate-related crime in the northern Plains are twice as large as the social costs in the
mid-Atlantic and South. Chapter 2 also shows that there are clear non-linearities in
the relationship between temperature and property crimes, with non-zero marginal ef-
fects only below a threshold at 40 degrees F. Similarly, Chapter 1 presents suggestive
(although only modestly significant) evidence that the welfare costs of sea level rise
may be low until the amount of remaining beach reaches a threshold level (10 or 20
feet), and then rise sharply.
A fourth set of issues that is a major focus of this dissertation is the challenge of present-
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ing information about climate change research in a way that is useful to policy makers
and the general public. Chapters 1 and 2 make clear why this is so problematic: the
impacts of climate change will be heterogeneous and nonlinear, and the methodologies
used to assess the impacts can be highly technical. Nonetheless, as Chapter 3 argues,
achieving consensus about appropriate climate policy actions will require effective and
transparent scientific communication of both results and methods, regardless of the
complexity of the problem of climate change.
Of course, in addition to the issues described here, research on the economics of climate
change must address many other challenges: how to aggregate micro-level empirical
impact studies to generate predictions of macro-level outcomes; how to characterize
the complex political interactions that will determine the future path of greenhouse
gas emissions; how to estimate the costs of different abatement policies; how to ac-
count for impacts that are difficult to monetize, such as regional biodiversity loss or
species extinction; how to evaluate the merits and drawbacks of geoengineering; and
how to evaluate the returns to investment in climate change policies relative to invest-
ments in policies addressing other social problems such as poverty, education, and
health. Although no single study can address all of these issues, the purpose of this
dissertation is to provide new research—set in the diverse contexts of coastal housing
markets, crime, and Bayesian learning—that contributes to a better understanding of
the economics of climate change.
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Chapter 1:
What Are the Welfare Costs of Shoreline Loss?
Housing Market Evidence from a Discontinuity Matching
Design
1.1 Introduction
Many sections of the U.S. coastline are severely eroding. The average long-term rate
of shoreline loss along the New England and mid-Atlantic coasts is 1.6 feet per year,
with much higher rates in areas such as southern Nantucket Island in Massachusetts
(12 feet per year) and the southern portion of the Delmarva Penninsula in Maryland
(9.5 feet per year) (Hapke et al, 2010; Woods Hole, 2000). In Florida, some segments of
beach lose as much as ten to twenty feet per year (FDEP, 2000, 2001). Under current
predictions of a 1.1 foot rise in average sea levels by the year 2100, these erosion rates
will accelerate, and between 3,000 and 7,000 square miles of dry land could be lost
(IPCC, 2007; Titus, 1989). Although it is possible to protect coastal areas from shoreline
loss—through installation of hardened features such as seawalls and groins, imposing
set-back and minimum-height home construction requirements, and performing peri-
odic nourishments to place new sand onto eroded beaches—the costs are substantial.
For example, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection projects that 1.1 bil-
lion dollars would be needed between 2011 and 2015 for full implementation of the
state’s strategic beach management plan.
Surprisingly, given both the substantial costs of preventing coastal erosion and the se-
rious risks posed by retreating shorelines and rising sea levels, there is little rigorous
evidence on the benefits of wider beaches for coastal property owners. Existing studies
suggest that the sale price of a coastal home increases between $70 and $8,000 per one
foot increase in beach width (Gopalakrishnan et al, 2010; Landry, Keeler, and Kriesel,
2003; Pompe and Rinehart, 1995). However, since cross-sectional hedonic property
value regressions suffer from well-known theoretical and econometric problems, the
interpretion of these estimates is not clear. Coefficients from hedonic regressions are
biased when one of the housing attributes (such as beach width) varies over time (Abel-
son and Markandya, 1985). Furthermore, cross-sectional hedonic regressions are vul-
nerable to problems with omitted variable bias (Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Kuminoff,
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Parmeter, and Pope, 2010)—as might be the case if higher quality houses are built along
wider sections of beach.
In this chapter, I estimate the welfare costs of shoreline loss along coastal beaches in
Florida, using three distinct research designs that each solve both of the theoretical and
econometric problems discussed above. These research designs are: (1) a repeat-sales
regression of housing prices on beach width that controls for fixed housing character-
istics and aggregate housing market shocks; (2) a differences-in-differences approach
based on the sharp and substantial discontinuity in beach width caused by beach nour-
ishment projects; and (3) a new “discontinuity matching” approach that exploits cap-
italized housing price differentials created by government policies that result in pre-
dictable changes in future beach width. In all three approaches, I take seriously the
problem of giving a theoretical interpretation to the estimated coefficients.
This chapter makes three main contributions. First, using the empirical approaches
discussed above, I develop the first panel data estimates of homeowners’ marginal
willingness to pay to avoid coastal shoreline loss. My analysis is based on a unique
dataset that includes 1.1 million housing sales transactions at parcels located within
five kilometers of a coastal beach in sixteen Florida counties between 1983 and 2009
(the dataset includes 388 miles of coastline). I link these data to high-resolution beach
width survey records at fixed monuments located approximately 1000 feet apart along
the Florida coastline. Finally, I add information about the timing, location, and vol-
ume of sand for 204 beach nourishment projects. This list represents the most detailed
dataset of Florida nourishment projects ever compiled.
Second, I develop a “Rosen-like” structural housing market model that provides an in-
tuitive interpretation for the coefficients from hedonic regressions of housing prices on
a time-varying neighborhood characteristic (such as beach width). When homebuyers
have rational expectations and changes in the characteristic are Markovian, the model
equilibrium implies that the cross-sectional relationship between housing prices and
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characteristics has an exact interpretion as willingness to pay for a policy interven-
tion that increases current amenity quality by one unit and then allows it to evolve
in an unconstrained way in future periods. Unlike previous work, which has treated
the coefficients from panel hedonic regressions as biased estimates of marginal will-
ingess to pay for a permanent increase in amenity quality (Abelson and Markandya,
1985; DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1994; Bayer, McMillan, Murphy, and Timmins, 2008;
Bishop and Murphy, 2011), I argue that it is much more accurate—and useful—to inter-
pret these coefficients as willingness to pay for a one-time marginal policy intervention
(such as beach nourishment).
The chapter’s third contribution is to develop a new “discontinuity matching” re-
search design that recovers consumers’ marginal willingness to pay by exploiting cap-
italized housing price differentials caused by construction projects that result in pre-
dictable changes in future amenity quality. Recent empirical work on hedonic mod-
els has considered several sources of identifying variation in amenity quality, includ-
ing unexpected shocks (Davis, 2004; Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008; Kuminoff and
Pope, 2010a,b) and cross-sectional discontinuities resulting from arbitrary geographic
boundaries such as school district borders (Black, 1999). In constrast, my discontinuity
matching approach exploits the change in capitalized housing prices that accompa-
nies predictable discontinuities in amenity quality. Typically, these discontinuities will
be the result of a policy intervention, e.g., beach nourishment, construction of a new
school, or completion of a public transportation project. For example, suppose that
two otherwise-similar houses are located on two different beaches, one of which—by
random chance—is heavily eroded this year. If the government announces that the
eroded beach will be nourished next year, then prospective homebuyers would ratio-
nally expect the two beaches to have similar width next year (and in all future periods).
Thus, a comparison of current prices and current beach width across these two houses
will reveal the marginal rental value of living on a wider beach for one year.
The chapter establishes several empirical results. First, using semi-parametric panel
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regressions, I find that beach width has only a modest effect on housing prices. Ac-
cording to these regressions, the difference in sales price between a house with a 200
foot wide beach and a house with 50 feet of beach is only about 2.1 percent. However,
houses with less than 20 feet of beach do experience a suggestive—but only marginally
significant—price discount of 6 to 14 percent. Second, my differences-in-differences re-
gressions show beach nourishment adds a statistically significant 83 feet to the width
of the average beach. However, housing prices only gain an insignificant 1.2 percent
between two years before and after nourishment, and I can reject the possiblity that
housing prices increase by more than 4.9 percent during this period. Finally, using the
discontinuity matching approach, I estimate that the yearly rental value of an extra
foot of beach is approximately $29 per household, and not statistically different from
zero. Overall, the results imply that the welfare costs of sea level rise may be low up to
a threshold, and then increase sharply.
This chapter builds on a growing literature on the microfoundations of hedonic models
(Rosen, 1974; Roback, 1982; Bajari and Benkard, 2005; Bishop and Timmins, 2008a,b;
Kuminoff and Jarrah, 2010). A few studies have cast housing choice as a dynamic util-
ity maximization problem (DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1994; Bayer, McMillan, Murphy,
and Timmins, 2008; Bishop and Murphy, 2011) or as a dynamic process with slow ad-
justment (Riddel, 2001; Mankiw and Weil, 1989), or have modeled neighborhood char-
acteristics as dynamic processes (McCluskey and Rausser, 2001). Others have devel-
oped methodologies for using panel data to identify hedonic regressions, either using
new discrete choice methods (Bajari et al, 2010; Kuethe, Foster, and Florax, 2008) or a re-
peat sales methodology employing first-differencing or fixed effects (Palmquist, 1982;
Mendelsohn et al, 1992). However, to the best of my knowledge, there are no hedonic
studies that attempt to estimate rental prices by decomposing sales prices into current
and future rental components. Although authors do recognize that the the price on
the left side of a hedonic equation should interpreted as a discounted sum of rental
prices (Dougherty and Van Order, 1982; Abelson and Markandya, 1985; Blackley and
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Follain, 1996; Meese and Wallace, 2003; Bajari and Kahn, 2007; Diewert, Nakamura,
and Nakamura, 2009) or as a sum of use and option values (Plantinga, Lubowski, and
Stavins, 2002), in practice, most studies use a “static-equivalent” rental price calcu-
lated by multiplying the sales price by the discount rate (Bajari and Kahn, 2005; Gy-
ourko and Tracy, 1991; Bishop and Murphy, 2011). The chapter is also related to more
macro-oriented literatures on housing markets, for example, literatures on calculating
price indices and implicit rents for owner-occupied housing (Case and Schiller, 1989;
Rondinelli and Veronese, 2011), evaluating the relationship between rental prices and
sales prices (Gallin, 2004), and assessing the welfare impacts of changes in housing
prices (Bajari, Benkard, and Krainer, 2005).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides background
on coastal shoreline retreat and beach nourishment. Section 1.3 describes a structural
model of a housing market and demonstrates how it can be used to calculate willing-
ness to pay for wider beaches. Section 1.4 describes my dataset and presents summary
statistics. Section 1.5 explains the details of my econometric approach, and Section 1.6
presents my main empirical results. Section 1.7 discusses the results, and Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Background
The United States has more than 12,000 miles of coastline, of which a significant portion
consists of sandy beaches (NationalAtlas.gov, 2011). Unlike dry land, coastal beaches
are highly dynamic physical environments that experience significant seasonal and
yearly changes. For example, many beaches erode during the winter, due to heavy
waves, and then accrete during milder summer weather. Over longer time horizons,
beaches exhibit a variety of erosional patterns that depend on natural factors such as
the underwater coastal profile, dominant wave and weather patterns, and major storm
events (NRC, 1995).
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Because proximity to the coast provides a variety of benefits, the land along many
beaches is heavily developed. Unfortunately, historical development patterns in many
areas have failed to anticipate the degree to which erosion can reshape the coastline.
Furthermore, some types of development, such as the dredging of coastal waterways
and inlets, have constributed substantially to erosion problems. Thus, many proper-
ties that once looked out over wide coastal beaches now face serious problems with
shoreline loss.
Policy responses to shoreline loss take several main forms (NRC, 1995). The first is
the construction of hardened features, such as seawalls and jetties, that are intended
to protect buildings and prevent sand from moving along the coast. Although these
features can succeed in trapping pockets of sand, they sometimes have the perverse
result of creating leeward hotspots in which erosion patterns are magnified. A second
policy option is establishing legal permitting requirements that require new houses to
be set back some specified distance from the beach. While this approach is workable in
undeveloped areas, it has the obvious drawback of failing to address erosion problems
at existing homes. A third option is abandonment and retreat. This is considered an
option of last resort.
One final policy response to coastal erosion along sandy beaches is beach nourish-
ment. In a typical nourishment project, sand from an offshore borrow area is pumped
or dredged onto a beach to make it wider (NRC, 1995). Because the volume of sand
required for nourishment projects is quite large—as high as several million tons—
locating suitable sources of sand is a major challenge for these projects. Furthermore,
the process is expensive: nourishment costs approximately one million dollars per mile
of beach (USACE, 1996). Because of this high cost, localities often obtain state and fed-
eral funding for nourishment projects. For example, between 1950 and 1993, the U.S.
Army Corps conducted 56 large beach nourishment projects that covered a total of 210
miles of U.S. shoreline. The cumulative federal cost share for these projects was $881
million dollars (USACE, 1996). The NOAA Coastal Resources Center (2009) reports
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that federal, state, and local organizations have spent at least $2.5 billion dollars on 242
major beach nourishment projects since 1950.
Although the costs of policy responses such as beach nourishment are not difficult to
calculate, the benefits of these policies are less clear. The central question is: what
is the value of widening a particular section of beach? This question is complicated
by the fact that beaches provide a variety of economic benefits to local communities,
including recreational opportunities, scenic views, protection from coastal storms, and
tourism revenues.
In this chapter, I focus on estimating only one component of the economic contribu-
tion of beaches: the welfare benefits to beachfront homeowners. Although there are
many reasons why beaches may be valuable, their contribution to the welfare of local
residents is likely to be one of the most important. Furthermore, by focusing on the
economic benefits to homeowners, I am able to use a hedonic property value approach
exploits the relationship between housing prices and beach quality (Rosen, 1974).
There is a small existing literature that uses such hedonic techniques to estimate the
benefits of wider beaches to local homeowners. To the best of my knowledge, all of
this previous work focuses on the cross-sectional relationship between beach width
and housing prices.1 The most recent of these studies is Gopalakrishnan et al (2010),
who instrument for beach width using distance from the continental shelf and beach
attributes such as scarps.2 They find that in a cross-section of coastal properties in
ten North Carolina towns, a one-foot increase in beach width is associated with a 1.1
percent increase in property values (about $8,800). Although their empirical strategy
does control for the potential endogeneity of beach nourishment decisions, it does not
address the possibility that higher-quality houses are more likely to be built on wider
1There has also been theoretical work on beach nourishment. Most notably, Smith et al (2009) dis-
cuss beach nourishment as an example of a dynamic capital accumulation problem. They show that
nourishment frequency depends on whether sand erodes at a rate greater or less than the discount rate.
2Other than Gopalakrishnan et al (2010), I am aware of no other studies of the benefits of beach width
that use quasi-experimental methods.
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beaches.
This cross-sectional literature also includes a variety of earlier studies. For example,
Landry, Keeler, and Kriesel (2003) estimate the benefits of beach nourishment for Ty-
bee Island, Georgia, using the cross-sectional relationship between beach width and
property values, for 318 properties sold between 1990 and 1997. They find that a one
meter increase in beach width increases property values by $213. Using similar tech-
niques, Pompe and Rinehart (1995) find that increasing beach width by one foot in-
creases beachfront property values by $558 to $754 in the Grand Strand area of North
Carolina. Properties half a mile inland also benefit by $165 to $254. Other authors
have also used hedonic techniques to evaluate the benefits of beach nourishment, but
their empirical strategies are less rigorous. For example, Edwards and Gable (1991)
use a hedonic model to estimate the value of proximity to a beach in South Kingstown,
Rhode Island, and then calculate the benefits of beach nourishment by assuming that
nourishment prevents beaches from becoming unusable. Parsons and Powell (2001)
use a similar methodology to evaluate the benefits of beach nourishment in Delaware.
Woglom (2003) develops a simulation model of beach nourishment, using parameter
estimates from earlier studies.
Additionally, a few related studies estimate the value of proximity to the coastline,
but do not directly analyze beach width. For example, Milon, Gressel, and Mulkey
(1984) use cross-sectional regressions to estimate how the value of a home depends on
its distance from the mean high water (MHW) mark, for homes in Apalachicola Bay,
Florida. Other similar studies include Bin et al (2008), Parsons and Wu (1991), and
Brown and Pollakowski (1977). Kriesel, Randal, and Lichtkoppler (1993) consider the
value of erosion protection in the Great Lakes. Bell and Leeworthy (1990) and Bin et
al (2005) use a travel cost approach to estimate the recreational benefits of beach days,
but do not consider the impact of beach width on willingness to pay.
As discussed in the introduction, the interpretation of estimates from this existing body
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of work faces several challenges, given potential theoretical and empirical problems.
When neighborhood attributes (such as beach width) vary over time, a regression of
housing prices on the time-variant attribute does not identify true marginal willing-
ness to pay for a permanent increase in attribute quality (Abelson and Markandya,
1985). Furthermore, since cross-sectional hedonic regressions are vulnerable to prob-
lems with omitted variable bias (Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Kuminoff, Parmeter, and
Pope, 2010), it is entirely possible that previous work has found a positive relation-
ship between housing prices and beach width because higher quality houses are built
along wider sections of beach. Thus, I devote the remainder of this chapter to develop-
ing several research designs for estimating homeowners’ willingness to pay for wider
beaches that solve both the theoretical and econometric issues in previous work.
1.3 Theory
1.3.1 Hedonic Model
In this section, I develop a simple structural model of a housing market, based on
Rosen (1974), that explicitly considers the time dimension of housing choice. The
model has two purposes. First, it provides a welfare interpretation for the coefficients
from panel hedonic regressions of housing prices on time-varying neighborhood char-
acteristics. Second, the model suggests a new “discontinuity matching” research de-
sign that can be used to recover homeowners’ implied valuations of neighborhood
characteristics. This procedure exploits capitalized housing price differentials caused
by policy interventions that lead to predictable improvements in future neighborhood
amenity quality (e.g., interventions such as beach nourishment, construction of a new
school, or completion of a public transportation project).
The model differs from other recent multi-period hedonic models (DiPasquale and
Wheaton, 1994; Bayer, McMillan, Murphy, and Timmins, 2008; Bishop and Murphy,
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2011) in several ways. First, my model is not dynamic, in the sense that all choices are
made in the first period, with no possibility of re-optimization or sorting in future pe-
riods. However, because these initial choices do reflect consumers’ expectations about
how housing characteristics will change in the future, the model still allows for an
“as-if” dynamics that captures much of the intuition and theoretical content of a fully-
dynamic model. Second, the model excludes transaction costs. Although real-estate
fees and moving costs do contribute substantially to the cost of purchasing a house,
inclusion of these transaction costs would complicate the model without changing its
fundamental conclusions. Third, consumers in my model have advance knowledge
about policy interventions that improve the quality of neighborhood characteristics.
This stands in contrast to other recent work, in which policy interventions are mod-
eled as unpredictable shocks (Davis, 2004; Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008; Kuminoff
and Pope, 2010a,b).
The model is as follows. Suppose that there are many heterogeneous consumers, in-
dexed 1, ..., j, ..., J , each of whom has preferences θj and receives fixed income y¯j each
period. Both θj and y¯j can vary across individuals, but are constant over time. There are
also many houses, indexed 1, ..., i, ..., I , each of which has a time-invariant character-
istic pii that represents permanent housing quality (e.g., a composite index measuring
the number of bedrooms, square footage, and ceiling height) and a time-variant char-
acteristic wit. Although wit could represent any housing or neighborhood amenity that
changes over time, for expositional purposes, suppose that all houses are located on
the coast, and that wit measures the width of beach between house i and the high-tide
mark. The evolution ofwit over time (due to erosion and accretion of sand) is described
by the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Markov Amenity Quality: The time-variant amenity wit follows a Markov
process. Furthermore, all houses share the same Markov transition probabilities for amenity
quality, given by the transition function T (w′, w):
Pr(wi,t+1 = w
′|wit = w) = T (w′, w) (1.1)
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Immediately before period 1 begins, each consumer takes out a loan, based on her
future income, and uses the loaned money to purchase a house at the market price
p(w1, pi). The model timing is such that at the time the consumer purchases a house,
she knows with certainty the amenity value in period 1 and has rational expectations
about the amenity values in period 2 onwards. Let r be the competitive interest rate.
Then, each period, the consumer pays the mortgage payment r · p(w1, pi) and uses her
remaining income that period to purchase c units of a “composite” good with unit price
1, where the composite good represents a mixture of any other goods and services that
the consumer finds desirable: food, entertainment, transportation, etc. A consumer’s
utility from consuming c units of the composite good and owning a house with current
characteristics w and pi for one time period is given by u(w, pi, c; θj). The shared pure
rate of time preference is ρ.
Let Γ represent the set of combinations of characteristics
{(w1,1, pi1), ..., (wi1, pii), ..., (wI1, piI)} of all houses in period 1. For analytical con-
venience, I formulate each consumer’s maximization problem as a choice of
characteristics, rather than as a choice of discrete houses. In other words, rather than
choosing a house i from the set of available houses {1, ..., I}, each consumer chooses a
combination of characteristics (w1, pi) from the set of available characteristics Γ. Thus,
dropping the subscripts i that index houses, consumer j’s maximization problem is:
max
(w1,pi),c∈{Γ,<+}
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
u(wt, pi, c; θj)
]
(1.2)
s.t.
{∑∞
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t
y¯j ≥ p(w1, pi) +
∑∞
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t
c
Pr(wt+1 = w
′|wt = w) = T (w′, w)
Equation (1.2) is a straightfoward expected utility maximization problem. The con-
sumer chooses beach width, permanent housing quality, and the composite good in
such a way as to maximize the expectation of the present discounted flow of future
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utility, while still satisfying the intertemporal budget constraint that the present dis-
counted sum of future income must be greater than or equal to the price of the selected
house plus the present discounted sum of future expenditures on the composite good.
Note here the analytical value of Assumption 1.1. Even though consumers are forward-
looking, the “memorylessness” property of Markov processes allows the price of house
i to be represented as a function of only two variables: wi1 and pii. In the beach width
example, the assumption implies that once a prospective homebuyer observes the cur-
rent width of the beach in front of house i, information about beach width in previous
periods provides no additional information about whether the beach is likely to erode
or accrete in the future. Thus, Assumption 1.1 collapses a vector of past and current
measurements and future beliefs about beach width into a single metric: current beach
width. This greatly simplifies the formulation and solution of the consumer’s choice
problem.
Under some mild regularity conditions (e.g., that the market is sufficiently thick that
there is no need to consider corner solutions caused by gaps in the continuum of hous-
ing characterics), the solution to (1.2) is characterized by the following first-order con-
ditions:
∂
∂w1
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
u
(
wt, pi, y¯j − rp(w1, pi); θj
)]
= 0 (1.3)
∂
∂pi
E
[ ∞∑
t=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
u
(
wt, pi, y¯j − rp(w1, pi); θj
)]
= 0 (1.4)
Let uj represent the utility function for consumer j with preferences θj . Interchanging
the order of the differentiation and expectation operators in Equation (1.3) leads to the
following result:
Theorem 1. Welfare Interpretation of Panel Hedonic Regressions: Suppose that in equi-
librium, consumer j purchases house i. Consider a counterfactual marginal policy intervention
that would increase the initial (period 1) quality of the time-varying amenity wi1 at house i by
one unit, and then allow it to evolve freely in future periods according to the Markov process
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described in Assumption 1. Consumer j’s willingness to pay for this intervention is given by
the derivative of equilibrium housing prices with respect to current amenity quality:
∂p
∂w1
∣∣∣
wi1
=
∑∞
t=1
(
1
1+ρ
)t
E
[
∂uj
∂w
∣∣
wt
∂wt
∂w1
∣∣
wi1
]
∑∞
t=1
(
1
1+ρ
)t
E
[
r
∂uj
∂c
∣∣
wt
] (1.5)
This theorem, which generalizes Rosen’s (1974) result, provides a welfare interpreta-
tion for the empirical relationship between housing prices and amenity quality.3 The
left-hand side of Equation (1.5) is the derivative of housing price with respect to the
time-varying amenity (e.g., beach width). This derivative can be directly estimated as
the coefficient from a regression of housing prices on beach width. The right-hand side
of Equation (1.5) represents consumer j’s willingness to pay—by giving up some of the
composite good each time period—to achieve the increase in expected utility caused
by starting at an initial amenity level that is one unit higher. Thus, unlike Rosen’s orig-
inal theorem, which interprets the relationship between housing prices and amenity
quality as willingness to pay for a permanent one-unit increase in amenity quality,
Equation (1.5) expresses willingness to pay for a policy intervention that increases ini-
tial amenity quality by one unit and then allows it to evolve in an unconstrained way
in future periods, according to the Markov transition function specified in Assumption
1.
The value of Theorem 1 is that it provides an exact welfare interpretation for the co-
efficients from hedonic regressions with time-varying characteristics. It is well known
from previous work that panel regressions produce biased estimates of marginal will-
ingess to pay for a permanent increase in amenity quality (Abelson and Markandya,
1985; DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1994; Bayer, McMillan, Murphy, and Timmins, 2008;
3In his seminal 1974 paper, Rosen develops a one-period housing market model in which hetero-
geneous consumers purchase houses of different quality. He argues that in this static equilibrium, the
relationship between price and amenity quality reflects the marginal consumer’s willingness to pay for
a marginal increase in the amenity. In my notation, his conclusion can be written as: ∂p∂w =
∂uj
∂w /
∂uj
∂c .
However, because his model has only one period, it is not applicable to situations in which w varies
over time.
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Bishop and Murphy, 2011). However, when the time-varying characteristic follows a
Markov process, Theorem 1 provides a useful economic intepretation for such regres-
sions. For example, in the context of this chapter, Theorem 1 implies that the coefficient
from a regression of housing prices on beach width can be interpreted as homeowners’
willingness to pay for a one-time beach nourishment project that widens the beach by
one foot in the current year.
1.3.2 Discontinuity Matching Research Design
Theorem 1 provides a valuable intepretation for the relationship between observed
housing prices and consumers’ preferences. However, in many circumstances, it is de-
sireable to know consumers’ exact marginal willingness to pay for a permanent increase
in amenity quality. Thus, in this section, I use the structural housing model from the
previous section to motivate a new “discontinuity-matching” research design that can
be used to estimate consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for a guaranteed, immedi-
ate, one-period, one-unit increase in amenity quality. This estimate can be then scaled,
using the discount rate, to generate an estimate of MWTP for a permanent increase in
amenity quality.
The core idea of the discontinuity matching design is to exploit capitalized hous-
ing price differentials caused by predictable discontinuities in future neighborhood
amenity quality. Typically, these discontinuities will be the result of a policy interven-
tion, e.g., beach nourishment, construction of a new school, or completion of a public
transportation project. Because the price of a house reflects the capitalized value of
the future flow of utility from owning that house, predictable improvements in future
amenity quality will be reflected in current prices. Thus, current price differences—
between matched sets of houses that are expected to have similar post-intervention
(post-discontinuity) amenity values—reflect only current differences in amenity qual-
ity.
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For additional intuition, consider the following example. Imagine two otherwise-
identical houses located on two different sections of beach. Suppose that both beaches
have similar rates of erosion, but that due to random fluctuations, one of the beaches
is heavily eroded this year, and other is not. Now, suppose that the government an-
nounces that next year, the heavily eroded section of beach will be nourished. As a re-
sult, potential homebuyers believe that the two sections of beach will be approximately
the same width next year. Because the houses located on these beaches are otherwise
identical, and because homebuyers have identical expectations about the widths of the
beaches in year 2 and onwards, any difference in the current-year sales price of the
two houses must be attributable to the current difference in beach width. Thus, after
controlling for consumers’ beliefs about beach width next year, the relationship be-
tween current housing prices and current beach width has an exact interpretation as
the marginal rental value of an extra year of improved beach width.
To prove a formal version of this argument, I use the structural housing model from
the previous section to model the consequences of a policy intervention that causes a
predictable future discontinuity in amenity quality. As before, at the start of period
1, amenity quality wi1 at each house is given. However, between periods 1 and 2, a
policy intervention equalizes amenity quality across all houses (or at least, equalizes
the probability distribution of amenity quality), regardless of each house’s period 1
quality. Then, in periods 3 onward, the amenity at each house evolves as a Markov
process.
A more formal statement of this assumption is as follows:
Assumption 2. Period 2 State Is Independent of Period 1 State: In period 1, amenity
quality wi1 at each house i is given. In period 2, amenity quality is determined by a policy
intervention. Let Fi2(w) be the post-intervention cumulative distribution function of amenity
quality wi2 at house i at time t = 2. Then:
Fi2(w|wi1) = F2(w) ∀i, w
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where F2(w) is a CDF that is shared by all houses in period 2 and is known by consumers when
they purchase houses at the beginning of period 1. In periods 3 and onward, amenity quality at
each house evolves independently according to the Markov process described in Assumption 1.
The key feature of Assumption 2 is that because of the policy intervention, period 1
amenity quality does not affect period 2 amenity quality. For example, for the coastal
houses described in the previous section, Assumption 2 implies that all sections of
beach are nourished to the same design width at the beginning of period 2, regardless
their width in period 1. Then, in periods 3 onwards, each section of beach erodes
and accretes independently according to a common Markov transition function. Thus,
from the perspective of a consumer purchasing a house at the beginning of period 1,
all houses have the same expected amenity quality in periods 2 onward.
Before proving the main result, I adopt one additional simplifying assumption: con-
sumers’ utility functions are quasilinear in the composite good c (or equivalently,
quasilinear in income). Formally:
Assumption 3. Quasilinear Utility: Consumer j’s utility function is quasilinear in the
composite good c:
u(w, pi, c; θj) ≡ v(w, pi; θj) + kjc (1.6)
where v(·; θj) may take any functional form and kj is a constant representing consumer j’s
marginal utility of consumption for the composite good.
For notational convenience, let uj represent the utility function for consumer j with
preferences θj . I now state the main theoretical result:
Theorem 2. Discontinuity Matching Theorem: Suppose that in equilibrium, consumer j
purchases house i. Under the conditions described in Assumptions 2 and 3, consumer j’s
willingness to pay for a certain one-unit increase in amenity quality for period 1 only is given
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by the derivative of equilibrium housing prices with respect to period 1 amenity quality:
∂p
∂w1
∣∣∣
wi1
=
∂uj
∂w
∣∣
wi1
r
ρ
· ∂uj
∂c
(1.7)
Proof. Theorem 1 states that:
∂p
∂w1
∣∣∣
wi1
=
∑∞
t=1
(
1
1+ρ
)t
E
[
∂uj
∂w
∣∣
wt
∂wt
∂w1
∣∣
wi1
]
∑∞
t=1
(
1
1+ρ
)t
E
[
r
∂uj
∂c
∣∣
wt
] (1.8)
By Assumption 3, marginal utility of consumption is constant, which implies that
Equation (1.8) can be rewritten as:
∂p
∂w1
∣∣∣
wi1
=
∑∞
t=1
(
1
1+ρ
)t
E
[
∂uj
∂w
∣∣
wt
∂wt
∂w1
∣∣
wi1
]
r
ρ
· ∂uj
∂c
(1.9)
Decomposing the right-hand side into current and future terms shows that:
∂p
∂w1
∣∣∣
wi1
=
∂uj
∂w
∣∣
wi1
r
ρ
· ∂uj
∂c
+
∞∑
t=2
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
E
[
∂uj
∂w
∣∣
wt
r
ρ
· ∂uj
∂c
· ∂wt
∂w1
∣∣
wi1
]
(1.10)
This equation makes it clear that in equilibrum, the cost of purchasing an extra unit
of the amenity depends on the (certain) marginal utility gained in period 1, plus the
discounted expected marginal utility gained in future time periods.
Now note that Assumption 2 implies that ∂wt
∂w1
= 0 for all t ≥ 2. In other words, changes
in period 1 amenity quality have no effect on amenity quality in periods 2 onward. As
a result, the future term in Equation (1.10) evaluates to zero and the equation simplifies
to the result shown in Equation (1.7).
Theorem 2 is the key theoretical contribution of this chapter. It shows that marginal
willingness to pay for a certain, immediate, one-unit, one-period increase in the
amenity can be calculated directly from the cross-sectional relationship between hous-
ing prices and amenity quality in the year before a policy intervention occurs. This
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fact is of great empirical importance. Because housing prices and amenity quality are
directly observable, the left-hand side of Equation (1.7) can be used to estimate a pa-
rameter that has an exact interpretation as marginal willingess to pay in a theoretically-
consistent hedonic model. This estimate of marginal willingness to pay for a temporary
increase in amenity quality can then be scaled up, using the discount rate, to estimate
marginal willingness to pay for a permanent change in amenity quality.
The logic underlying Theorem 2 rests on the assumption that the policy intervention
causes all houses to have the same expected amenity quality in period 2, regardless of
their period 1 quality. To achieve this equalization, between periods 1 and 2 some
houses experience a large discontinuity in amenity quality, and some experience a
smaller discontinuity. Thus, although pre-intervention amenity quality differs across
houses, all houses have identical predicted post-discontinuity quality. It is this “dis-
continuity matching” on the basis of expected period 2 amenity quality that justifies
interpreting price differences between houses as a measure of willingness to pay for
marginal improvements in period 1 amenity quality.
Like many theoretical results, the practical value of Theorem 2 depends on whether or
not its predicates—particularly Assumption 2—are true in relevant real-world situa-
tions. I argue that as long as it is possible to control for idiosyncratic time shocks and
fixed housing characteristics, then Assumption 2 will be true in a number of practically
useful situations. For example, in the empirical section of this chapter, I use disconti-
nuity matching to estimate homeowners’ willingess to pay for a home located on a
wider section of beach, using the sharp and highly-predictable change in beach width
caused by nourishment projects. By matching sections of beach that are predicted to
have similar widths next period, this approach allows a comparison of the current pe-
riod price of houses located on narrow sections of beach (that receive nourishment
next period) against the price of houses located on wide sections of beach (that are not
nourished next period). However, the methodology could also be applied in many
other contexts. For example, it could be used to estimate marginal willingness to pay
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for construction of new subway or bus lines, based on the differential discontinuity in
public transportation access caused by the opening of the new station or line.
1.4 Data
To support my analysis of the welfare costs of coastal shoreline loss, I have constructed
a unique dataset on housing sales transactions, beach width, and nourishment projects,
for properties located within 5 kilometers of the beach in sixteen coastal Florida coun-
ties. The dataset covers the period from 1983 to 2009, and includes 388 miles of
Florida’s coastline.
The sixteen counties included in the analysis are: Bay, Brevard, Broward, Charlotte,
Duval, Escambia, Lee, Manatee, Martin, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, Pinellas, Sarasota,
St. Johns, St. Lucie, and Volusia. Figure 1.1 shows the a map of these counties, and in-
dicates coastal areas where beach width survey data are available. As the map shows,
these counties are primarily located on Florida’s Atlantic coast and southern Gulf coast.
These counties were chosen because they collectively cover the majority of segments
of shoreline designated as “critically-eroded” by the Florida Department of Environ-
mental Protection (FDEP, 2011b).
Below, I describe each of the data sources in more detail.
1.4.1 Beach Width Data
I have compiled data on beach width from a database of coastal surveys maintained
by the Florida Department of Enviromental Protection (FDEP, 2008a). Each record in
the database represents the distance from a fixed coastal survey monument to the mean
high water (MHW) mark along a particular segment of beach beach.4 The survey mon-
uments are spaced approximately 1,000 feet apart along much of the Florida coastline;
4The mean high water mark represents the location on the beach reached by the average high tide.
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Figure 1.1: Map of the Study Area
Note: The thick solid line denotes areas where coastal mean high water (MHW) line survey data is
available from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection. Grey shaded areas represent the
sixteen in-sample individual counties.
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thus, these data have a high level of geographic resolution. In most locations, surveys
are available every few years between 1983 and 2009, with better coverage in recent
years.
Because the survey monuments are not located at a consistent distance from the upper
end of the beach, the MHW data do not represent absolute beach width. To calculate
absolute beach width, I use georeferenced aerial photography data (FDEP, 2011a) to
manually geocode the location of the upper end of the beach near each survey mon-
ument. For consistency in determining the upper end of the beach, I use the location
of the most seaward manmade structure near each survey monument. I then calculate
beach width as the distance from the upper end of the beach to the survey monument,
plus the distance from the survey monument to the MHW mark, with a trigonometric
adjustment to account for the angle at which the MHW survey measurements were
taken.
1.4.2 Property Sales Data
I have collected data on approximately 1.1 million qualified housing sales transac-
tions in the sixteen in-sample counties. These data are taken from electronic records
maintained by the property appraisers’ offices in each county. The data include sales
information, such as sale date, sale price, and sale qualification, as well as property
characteristics, including building type, acreage, and construction date.
I use two methods to geocode the location of each property. When possible, I link each
property’s parcel ID number to detailed GIS parcels maps obtained from the Florida
Department of Revenue (FDEP, 2011). In cases when there is no match, I geocode the
property’s street address using ESRI’s ArcMap Business Analyst, using address point
data when available and otherwise using an offset of 70 feet from the address location
along the street centerline. I then link each geocoded address to the nearest GIS parcel,
and use that parcel for subsequent analysis.
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For each parcel, I then calculate the distance to the coast. I also assign each parcel-
by-year observation a beach width measurement, based on beach width at the nearest
FDEP survey monument.
1.4.3 Nourishment Data
I have constructed a list of beach nourishment projects using data from several sources.
My primary source is a database compiled by researchers at Western Carolina Uni-
versity (WCU, 2008). This database lists 361 beach nourishment projects that took
place in Florida between 1944 and 2006. I supplement this data with information from
Florida State University’s beach erosion control database, a list of ongoing nourish-
ment projects maintained by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, and
a variety of other sources (e.g., FSU, 2008b; FDEP, 2009). After merging these data and
eliminating duplicate and out-of-sample records, I generate a dataset that represents
the near-universe of nourishment projects that took place between 1983 and 2009 in the
16 in-sample counties.
Table 1.1 provides detailed information about a subset of the largest nourishment
projects included in the analysis. The table shows the set of variables that I have been
able to collect for each nourishment project, including the year the project was com-
pleted, the project location, the cost of the project, the volume of sand deposited, and
the length of beach nourished. Unfortunately, not all variables—particularly costs—are
available for all nourishment projects.
Table 1.2 describes the characteristics of the 204 projects included in my analysis.
The table shows that the average project placed 700,000 cubic yards of sand (roughly
900,000 tons) onto a 3.8 mile segment of beach, for an average nourishment intensity
of approximately 47 cy/ft. The average cost of a nourishment project was $6.6 million.
The table also summarizes the characteristics of a set of “major” projects with nourish-
ment intensities of at least 25 cy/ft. As expected, these projects had higher volumes,
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Table 1.1: Examples of Major Beach Nourishment Projects
County Beach Year Volume Length Intensity Cost
(cy, millions) (miles) (cy/ft) (millions)
Bay Panama City Beach 1999 9.1 18.3 98 41.9
Brevard Cape Canaveral-Cocoa Beach 2001 3.1 9.4 64 26.8
Brevard South Reach Beach 2002 1.2 3.1 67 .
Broward Broward County Segment III 2006 1.5 9.3 40 3.1
Broward Hollywood-Hallandale 1991 1.1 5.1 40 14.3
Broward Pompano Beach-Lauderdale 1983 1.9 6.0 66 15.0
Dade Sunny Isles 1988 1.3 2.6 88 27.9
Duval Amelia Island 2002 1.9 5.1 96 9.4
Duval Mayport-Kathryn Abby Hanna 1985 1.3 2.2 102 4.0
Escambia Pensacola Beach 2003 4.2 8.2 96 23.0
Escambia Pensacola Beach 2006 3.5 8.2 79 10.4
Escambia Perdido Key 1985 2.4 1.2 520 9.9
Escambia Perdido Key 1990 5.4 5.1 211 20.3
Lee Captiva Island 1989 1.6 5.5 61 10.9
Lee Captiva Island 1996 1.1 8.8 34 .
Lee Captiva Island 2006 1.4 9.8 39 .
Manatee Anna Maria Key 1993 2.3 4.6 92 19.3
Manatee Anna Maria Key 2002 1.9 5.3 65 9.8
Martin Jupiter Island 1983 1.0 7.8 26 5.1
Martin Jupiter Island 1987 2.2 7.8 57 6.5
Martin Jupiter Island 1996 1.7 5.5 64 9.7
Martin Jupiter Island 2002 3.0 7.7 77 1.8
Martin Jupiter Island 2007 2.3 7.3 62 .
Palm Beach Boca Raton North 1988 1.1 1.5 129 6.3
Palm Beach Delray Beach 1984 1.3 2.9 80 8.0
Palm Beach Delray Beach 1992 1.2 1.6 123 7.3
Palm Beach Delray Beach 2002 1.1 1.6 118 4.6
Palm Beach Juno Beach 2001 1.0 3.4 72 13.2
Palm Beach Midtown Beach 2003 1.4 10.2 93 .
Palm Beach Palm Beach 1984 1.3 15.3 33 .
Palm Beach Palm Beach 1992 1.2 15.1 30 6.0
Palm Beach Phipps Ocean Park 2006 1.0 1.6 121 .
Pinellas Sand Key 2006 1.3 6.9 34 23.4
Pinellas Sand Key Phase II 1990 1.3 2.6 87 2.4
Pinellas Sand Key Phase IV 1999 1.6 6.7 43 22.9
Sarasota Longboat Key - multicounty 1993 3.1 12.8 63 27.3
St Johns Anastasia - St Augustine 2003 4.4 4.3 217 .
St Johns Anastasia - St Augustine 2005 2.8 2.9 185 14.1
St Johns Duval County 1995 1.2 5.9 37 .
St Lucie Martin County 1996 1.3 4.3 59 11.6
Note: This table presents basic characteristics for the 40 largest (by volume of sand placed on the
beach) of the 204 beach nourishment projects included in the main analysis. Note that length is esti-
mated from the length of shoreline covered by the FDEP survey markers affected by the nourishment
project.
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Table 1.2: Characteristics of Beach Nourishment Projects
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Observations
All Nourishments
Year Completed 1996 7 1983 2007 204
Volume (cy, millions) 0.7 1.0 0.0 9.1 204
Length (miles) 3.8 3.8 0.2 19.4 204
Intensity (cy/ft) 47 51 0 520 204
Cost (millions) 6.6 8.1 0.0 41.9 127
Sales 62 130 0 1,473 204
Major Nourishments
Year Completed 1997 7 1983 2007 94
Volume (cy, millions) 1.2 1.3 0.2 9.1 94
Length (miles) 4.2 3.5 1.0 18.3 94
Intensity (cy/ft) 75 60 25 520 94
Cost (millions) 9.8 8.6 0.9 41.9 68
Sales 72 172 0 1,473 94
Note: This table summarizes the characteristics of the set of beach nourishment
projects included in the main analysis. The top panel includes all projects; the
bottom panel includes only “major” nourishment projects covering 1 mile or more
of beach, with nourishment intensity greater than or equal to 25 cubic yards per
foot. In both panels, the sales variable represents the number of sales that occurred
at properties within 20 meters of a nourished section of beach, in the year in which
the beach was nourished. The observations variable represents the number of
nourishment projects for which the selected variable is available.
covered more shoreline, and had higher costs.
1.4.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 summarizes basic characteristics of the properties and beaches included in the
main analysis, for the subset of properties located within 20 meters of a beach. The re-
sults are disaggregated into three categories based on the number of nourishments that
took place at each FDEP marker between 1980 and 2010. The top two panels shows that
housing and beach characterisics in nourished areas differ significantly from housing
and beach characteristics in areas that are never nourished.
The third panel in Table 1.3 describes the number of sales that occur in each five year
period between 1980 and 2010, for properties located within 20 meters of the beach.
The panel shows that there are 41,187 sales at FDEP survey monuments that are never
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics
Number of Major Nourishments per Monument
0 1 or 2 3 or more
Housing Characteristics
Single Family 0.10 (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.09 (0.00)
Condo 0.90 (0.00) 0.97*** (0.00) 0.91 (0.00)
Vacant 0.18 (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00)
Parcel Acreage 0.59 (0.01) 0.29*** (0.01) 1.35*** (0.02)
Housing Area (sq ft) 1,593 (12) 1,369*** (6) 1,701*** (24)
Bedrooms 1.94 (0.01) 1.62*** (0.01) 2.68*** (0.04)
Bathrooms 1.99 (0.01) 1.78*** (0.01) 2.45*** (0.04)
Year Renovated 1983.1 (0.1) 1982.0*** (0.1) 1999.2*** (0.2)
Year Built 1980.4 (0.1) 1978.3*** (0.1) 1981.4*** (0.2)
Structure Quality (1-6) 3.03 (0.01) 3.20*** (0.01) 3.21*** (0.02)
Brick Construction 0.12 (0.00) 0.09*** (0.00) 0.10*** (0.00)
Features Appraised Value 2,327 (219) 719*** (46) 5,209*** (402)
Distance to Beach (m) 1 (0) 1*** (0) 1*** (0)
Sales per Parcel 2.59 (0.01) 2.63*** (0.01) 2.77*** (0.01)
Sale Price (000s) 987 (15) 1,059*** (14) 538*** (15)
Beach Characteristics
Beach Width (ft) 195.3 (1.0) 235.1*** (0.7) 197.0 (0.9)
Std Dev Beach Width (ft) 33.11 (0.36) 42.31*** (0.13) 56.84*** (0.41)
Nourishments 0.00 (0.00) 0.98*** (0.00) 2.69*** (0.01)
Cumulative Intensity (cy/ft) 0.00 (0.00) 56.58*** (0.29) 143.18*** (0.82)
Sales, by Time Period
1983 to 1984 1,968 2,580 759
1985 to 1989 6,456 7,719 1,966
1990 to 1994 6,314 10,733 1,998
1995 to 1999 8,529 13,403 2,515
2000 to 2004 11,495 18,730 2,888
2005 to 2009 6,425 12,592 1,677
All years 41,187 65,757 11,803
Geographic Units
Parcels 15,888 24,998 4,259
FDEP Survey Monuments 679 454 171
Six mile zones 51 45 18
Note: The “Housing Characteristics” panel presents mean unweighted parcel
characteristics, with standard deviations in parentheses. The “Beach Charac-
teristics” panel presents mean unweighted FDEP survey monument character-
istics, with standard deviations in parentheses. The “Sales, by Time Period”
panel presents the number of sales that occurred in each five-year period be-
tween 1980 and 2010. The “Geographic Units” panel describes the number of
geographic units includes in the analysis. The columns represent the number of
major nourishments (with intensity>25 cy/ft) at each FDEP survey monument.
All t-tests are relative to the 0 nourishments group. * denotes p<.05; ** denotes
p<.01; *** denotes p<.001.
26
nourished, 65,757 sales at monuments with one or two nourishments, and 11,803 sales
at monuments with three or more nourishments. The number of sales increases over
most of the sample, reaching a peak in 2000-2004 (at the height of the housing bubble)
and then falling off in more recent years.
The fourth panel in Table 1.3 shows the number of geographic units represented by
properties within 20 meters of the beach. There are 45,145 such properties, located
near 1,304 FDEP survey monuments in 67 six-mile-long “zones”. I have defined these
zones as continguous sections of coastline that span six miles each. Because the beach
width data show substantial spatial correlation between adjacent FDEP monuments
(which are only 1,000 feet apart on average), I cluster and weight all regression results
in this chapter at the level of these zones.
An important constraint on my analysis is the availability of survey data on beach
width. Figure 1.2 shows the availability of beach width data, by year and location
along the coastline. As the figure indicates, data on beach width is available in only
about a third of the survey monument-by-year combinations. This missing data is
serious concern for my panel and discontinuity matching regressions. I deal with this
problem in two ways. In the repeat sales panel regressions, I adopt the assumption that
the data are missing at random after controlling for property and time fixed effects.
In the discontinuity matching approach, I use imputed width data.5 However, note
that because the differences-in-differences regressions do not require data on beach
width, they are not affected by the missing data issue. The availability of this unbiased
approach alleviates concerns about data problems in the other two approaches.
Figure 1.2 also shows the location and timing of beach nourishment projects. Several
patterns are evident from the figure. First, many segments of beach are nourished at
somewhat regular intervals, ranging from three to ten years. Second, nourishments
5I impute missing beach width data using an expectation-maximization algorithm that employs a
Kalman filter followed by smoothing. Details about the imputation procedure are available upon re-
quest.
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Figure 1.2: Location and Timing of Surveys and Nourishment Projects
Note: The upper panel shows the availability of beach width survey data, by year and location along
the coast. The lower panel shows the timing of beach nourishment projects, by year and location. Major
beach nourishment projects are shown in black; minor projects are shown in grey. Each point on the x-
axis represents a unique coastal survey monument (in most areas, monuments are spaced approximately
1000 feet apart along the coast). To construct this figure, monuments were ordered from north to south
along Florida’s Gulf coast, and then from north to south along Florida’s Atlantic coast. The x-axis should
not be interpreted as a measure of absolute distance, only of relative location. As shown in Figure 1.1,
survey coverage of Florida’s coastline is incomplete.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Beach Width, by Nourishment Frequency
Note: This figure shows histograms of beach width, for all beaches, and by nourishment frequency.
Beach widths greater than 500 ft are shown at 500 ft. Each observation represents a unique survey
monument and year. The figure includes data from 1983 to 2009 for all in-sample counties.
only occur at certain segments of coastline.
Finally, Figure 1.3 shows a histogram of the distribution of beach width across all
monument-by-year observations. The figure shows that the modal beach width is ap-
proximately 140 feet, and that the distribution of beach width has a long right tail. As
the figure indicates, most beaches are between 25 and 400 feet wide.
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1.5 Econometric Approach
In this chapter I take three distinct econometric approaches to estimating homeown-
ers’ willingness to pay for wider beaches: (1) a repeat sales panel approach; (2) a
differences-in-differences approach; and (3) a new “discontinuity matching” approach.
In the following subsections, I explain how each research design uses housing market
data to estimate ∂pt
∂wt
∣∣
wit
, the partial derivative of the housing price function at time t
with respect to beach width at time t. Under the assumption that the structural model
described in Section 3 captures the main features of housing markets in coastal Florida,
I use Theorems 1 and 2 to provide direct welfare interpretations for the estimated co-
efficients.
1.5.1 Repeat Sales Panel Approach
I begin by using a repeat sales panel approach to develop an estimator for ∂pt
∂wt
∣∣
wit
. By
Theorem 1 from Section 3, this partial derivative is equal to the marginal consumer’s
willingness to pay for a one-time policy intervention that would add one foot of sand
to the beach in front of house i at time t, and then allow beach width to evolve freely
in future periods. To motivate the estimator for this derivative, I adopt the following
notation.
Let each beachfront house i belong to a neighborhood n, where n represents closest
FDEP survey monument (so that the average neighborhood includes roughly 1000 feet
of shoreline). Let pnit represent the sale price of house i in neighborhood n in year t,
and let wnt describe beach width in neighborhood n in year t. As before, pii represents
unobservable permanent characteristics of house i. Additionally, let τt capture aggre-
gate housing market shocks in year t, and let nit be an normally distributed, zero-mean
error term, with variance σ2, that captures other sources of variation in price.
Following common practice in the hedonics literature, I assume that the price function
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pnit ≡ p(wnt, τt, pii, nit) takes a log-linear functional form. However, to allow for more
flexibility in the relationship between price and beach width, I use a semi-parametric
specification for wnt. Let the binary variables w0nt, w50nt , ..., w
j
nt, ..., w
500
nt indicate whether
beach width in neighborhood n in year t is between j feet and j+50 feet. I then assume
that the price function can be written as:
log pnit =
∑
j
βjw
j
nt + τt + pii + nit (1.11)
Equation (1.11) suggests calculating marginal willingness to pay for a policy interven-
tion using the following approximations to the partial derivative of price with respect
to width:
E
[
∂p
∂wt
∣∣
wt=wj
]
≈ E
[
p(wJ , τt, pii, nit)− p(w0, τt, pii, nit)
wJ − w0
]
=
(eβJ − eβ0)eτt+pii+(σ2/2)
wJ − w0 (1.12)
where with some mild abuse of notation, I let wj ≡ j indicate the lower end of the jth
beach width bin.
To estimate willingness to pay using Equation (1.12), I first use panel data on repeat
housing sales to estimate Equation (1.11) using ordinary least squares. The identify-
ing assumption is that conditional on the year and house fixed effects, variation in
beach width is orthogonal to any other housing price determinants captured in the er-
ror term. Because beach width at adjacent survey monuments is highly correlated, I
cluster standard errors by six-mile-long sections of beach. Additionally, to improve the
efficiency of the estimates, I weight each observation by the sum of the inverse of the
total number of housing sales in its neighborhood. Then, in a second step, I substitute
the estimated coefficients from Equation (1.11) into Equation (1.12) and calculate the
marginal willingness to pay estimate ∂̂p
∂wt
∣∣
wt
.
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1.5.2 Differences-in-Differences Approach
One potential concern about the repeat-sales approach is that within particular neigh-
borhoods, long-term changes in beach width may be correlated with changes in long-
term determinants of housing prices. For example, as neighborhoods become wealth-
ier, they may make more frequent investments in beach nourishment. In the panel
model from the previous section, this would create correlation between the beach
width bin variables and the error term.
To address this possibility, I implement a differences-in-differences regression ap-
proach based on abrupt changes in beach width caused by nourishment projects.
Again, the goal is to estimate the derivative ∂pt
∂wt
∣∣
wit
. The advantage of a differences-in-
differences approach is that the factors that influence the decision to nourish a partic-
ular strech of beach—such as neighborhood wealth and political influence—are likely
to evolve slowly over time. Thus, after inclusion of appropriate fixed effects, the sud-
den increase in beach width caused by beach nourishment is likely to be orthogonal to
other determinants of housing prices.
Unfortunately, the disadvantage of a differences-in-differences approach is that it fits
less well into the structural model that provides a welfare interpretation for the deriva-
tive ∂pt
∂wt
∣∣
wit
. Theorem 1 depends on the assumption that changes in beach width can
be modeled as a Markov process. To argue that beach nourishment fits this assump-
tion requires that (1) homebuyers have no advance knowledge of beach nourishment
projects, and (2) the decision to nourish beaches is random, conditional on beach width
in the previous period. Neither assumption is a perfect description of reality. However,
for the purposes of this section, I proceed as if both assumptions hold. Then, in the fol-
lowing section, I describe a discontinuity matching design that is better able to estimate
the welfare effects of deliberate policy interventions.
I implement the differences-in-differences approach in two steps. First, I divide the
coastline into one-mile “neighborhoods” and then use houses with repeat sales to de-
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velop a housing price index for each of these neighborhoods. Second, I run differences-
in-differences regressions on a dataset that includes five years of forward and back-
ward lagged data for each neighborhood-by-year observation.
The following subsections describe these two steps in more detail.
Step 1: Neighborhood Housing Price Indices
Before running the differences-in-differences regressions, I estimate a separate hous-
ing price index for each one-mile beachfront neighborhood. Developing price indices
serves two purposes. First, it removes variation in prices that can be attributed to
fixed idiosyncratic characteristics of individual houses. Second, it transforms an un-
balanced panel of housing sales transactions, which contains only two or three sales
per house, into a balanced panel of price indices with an observation for almost every
year and neighborhood combination. Because there is only modest variation in beach
width across individual FDEP survey monuments within one-mile sections of coast-
line, this transformation sacrifices little information about the relationship between
housing prices and beach width. Using a price index rather raw housing sales data is
necessary because I include only five years of forward and backward lagged data for
each neighborhood-by-year observation.
To estimate the price indices, I model the price function pnit ≡ p(Pnt, pii, nit) as de-
pending on three sets of parameters: fixed effects Pnt that capture all sources of
neighborhood-by-year variation in housing prices, house fixed effects pii that reflect
fixed characteristics of house i, and a zero-mean error term nit. The fixed effects Pnt
represent the price index for neighborhood n in year t. I assume that these parameters
enter the price function according to the following log-linear functional form:
log pnit = pii + τnt + nit (1.13)
where I define τnt ≡ log(Pnt). I estimate this equation using OLS, and then use the
estimated coefficients to calculate the price index Pnt = exp(τnt) for each neighborhood
33
and year unit.
It is important to note that any subsequent regression of this price index on other hous-
ing and neighborhood variables will be consistent only if: (i) the regression includes
neighborhood fixed effects, and (ii) none of the independent variables vary at the level
of individual houses.
Step 2: Differences-in-Differences Regressions
The differences-in-differences research design uses changes in housing prices at
beaches that are not nourished to generate a counterfactual for changes in housing
prices at beaches that are nourished. This comparison depends on the identifying as-
sumption that in the absence of nourishment, the trend in prices at nourished beaches
would have been similar to the trend in prices at unnourished beaches.
To run differences-in-differences regressions, I construct a dataset that includes five
years of pre-data and four years of post-data for each neighborhood-by-year observa-
tion. Let t represent the base year for each set of observations, and let l represent time
elapsed since the base year. Thus, each neighborhood-by-year observation appears ten
times, as (n, t, l) = (n, t + 5,−5), ..., (n, t− 1,−1), (n, t, 0), ..., (n, t− 4, 4). I then assume
that the housing price index function P (Nnt, τtl, pint) can be modeled as:
Pntl =
4∑
s=−5
βsNnt · 1{l = s}+ τtl + pint + ntl (1.14)
In this equation, Nnt is a dummy variable that indicates that the beach near neighbor-
hood n was nourished in the base year t. The indicator 1{l = s} takes value 1 if l = s,
and zero otherwise. The year-by-elapsed year fixed effects τtl capture aggregate hous-
ing market shocks, and the neighborhood-by-base year fixed effects pintl capture fixed
neighborhood characteristics of neighborhood n for the set of ten elapsed observations
with common base year t. Because of the possibility that adjacent neighborhoods do
not represent independent observations, I cluster standard errors by six-mile-long sec-
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tions of beach.
I also develop similar a differences-in-differences model of beach width. Using the
same dataset of pre- and post-data, I model the beach width wntl ≡ w(Nnt, λtl, κnt) as
follows:
wntl =
4∑
s=−5
φsNnt · 1{l = s}+ λtl + κnt + ζntl (1.15)
In this equation, wntl represents beach width in neighborhood n in year t, lagged l
years. The binary variable Nnt indicates that the beach in neighborhood n was nour-
ished in year t, and the indicator 1{l = s} takes value 1 if l = s, and zero otherwise. The
base year-by-elapsed year fixed effects λtl capture aggregate shocks to beach width,
and the neighborhood-by-base year fixed effects κnt capture fixed differences in beach
width between neighborhoods, for sets of elapsed observations with the same base
year. The zero-mean error term ζntl captures other sources of variation in beach width.
The rationale for constructing this “stacked” dataset is that because beach width
approximately follows a random walk, the fixed-effects approach embedded in a
differences-in-differences design is not really an appropriate model. However, by lim-
iting each fixed effect to include only ten years of data, I minimize inaccuracies by
modeling changes over only a short period of time. Note that because I estimate sepa-
rate coefficients for each forward and backward lag of beach nourishment, and because
I cluster standard errors by neighborhood and base year, duplicating observations in
this way does not raise concerns about overestimating the precision of the coefficients.
To use the differences-in-differences results to calculate the derivative ∂pt
∂wt
∣∣
wit
, I first
estimate Equations (1.14) and (1.15) using OLS. I then approximate the average deriva-
tive of price with respect to beach width as:
E
[
∂p
∂wt
∣∣
wt
]
≈ E
[
P (Nnt = 1, τt0, pint)− P (Nnt = 0, τt0, pint)
w(Nnt = 1, λt0, κnt)− w(Nnt = 0, λt0, κnt)
]
=
β0
φ0
(1.16)
Under the assumptions discussed above and in Theorem 1, this derivative represents
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willingness to pay for a one-time beach nourishment project that adds one foot of sand
to the beach in the current year.
In addition to the main differences-in-differences specification discussed above, I also
run alternative regressions in which I break down the impacts of beach nourishment
based on the intensity of each project (measured in cubic yards of sand added per foot
of coastline). I divide nourishments into four categories: 1 to 24 cy/ft, 25 to 50 cy/ft, 50
to 74 cy/ft, and 75 or more cy/ft. I then run differences-in-differences regressions for
price and width that include separate sets of nourishment variables for nourishments
in each of these categories. Using these coefficients, I then generate several alternative
estimates of the derivative ∂pt
∂wt
∣∣
wit
.
1.5.3 Discontinuity Matching Approach
The repeat sales and differences-in-differences designs from the previous sections both
have drawbacks. Although Theorem 1 provides a strong theoretical foundation for
the repeat sales design, this approach is vulnerable to omitted variables that change
over time within neighborhoods. In contrast, although the differences-in-differences
design is a more robust empirical approach, using Theorem (1) to give a welfare inter-
pretation to coefficients from differences-in-differences regressions requires somewhat
unrealistic assumptions.
To overcome the limitations of these two approches, in this section I describe a new
“discontinuity matching” research design, motivated by Theorem 2, that uses pre-
dictable discontinuities in beach width to identify marginal willingness to pay. The
goal of this procedure is to develop an estimate of the derivative ∂pt
∂wt
∣∣
wit
from Theorem
2. Recall that under the conditions specified in Theorem 2, this derivative expresses the
marginal consumer’s willingness to pay for an immediate, one-period, marginal in-
crease in beach width. For this result to hold, prospective homebuyers must be aware
that next period, the government will implement a beach nourishment project that will
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cause a discontinuity in beach width along some sections of coastline. I argue that this
condition is a reasonable approximation of reality.
Implementing the discontinuity matching research design requires three steps. First,
I divide beachfront houses into mile-long neighborhoods, and then estimate a hous-
ing price index for each neighborhood-by-year cell. This step removes cross-sectional
variation in price that can be attributed to fixed characteristics of individual houses.
Second, I develop a simple rational model of homebuyers’ beliefs about the effect of
nourishment projects on beach width, and then estimate the parameters of this model
using historical data on beach width. Third, I use a nearest-neighbor matching proce-
dure to identify sets of neighborhood-by-year units that are predicted to have similar
beach width in the following year (based on the empirical belief model). Within each
matched set, all neighborhoods share the same next-period predicted beach width.
However, some neighborhoods reach that next-period beach width by being nour-
ished; some reach it without nourishment. Thus, I use the matching procedure to
estimate the treatment effect of next-period nourishment on the current width and price
index of these two sets of neighborhoods, and then use these treatment effects to cal-
culate the pre-intervention cross-sectional derivative between price and beach width.
Under Theorem 2, this derivative can be interpreted as the marginal rental value of
widening the beach by one foot for one year.
I now discuss these three steps in more detail.
Step 1: Estimate Neighborhood Housing Price Indices
I begin the discontinuity matching procedure by estimating a separate housing price
index for each one-mile-long beachfront neighborhood. As in the difference-in-
differences approach, developing price indices removes variation in prices that can be
attributed to fixed characteristics of individual houses, and transforms an unbalanced
panel of housing sales into a balanced panel of neighborhood price indices. Because
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there is relatively little variation in beach width within these one-mile neighborhoods,
this transformation sacrifices little information about the relationship between housing
prices and beach width.
To estimate the neighborhood price indices, I follow the procedure described previ-
ously in Section 1.5.2.
Step 2: Model Homebuyers’ Beliefs about Beach Width
The second step of the discontinuity matching procedure is to develop and estimate a
model of homebuyers’ beliefs about the evolution of beach width over time. Although
there are a variety of possible belief structures, I assume a simple model in which a
consumer who buys a house knows current beach width, as well as whether the beach
will be nourished the following year, and makes rational predictions based on this
information.6 More formally, let a consumer’s information set at time t include current
width wnt and a next-period nourishment indicator Nn,t+1, for every neighborhood n.
The consumer believes that the evolution of beach width over time follows an AR(1)
process:
wnt = κ+ αwn,t−1 + φNnt + ζnt (1.17)
in which current beach width wnt depends on a constant term κ, previous-year beach
width wn,t−1, a current nourishment indicator Nnt, and a normally-distributed zero-
mean error term ζnt. I assume the consumer’s information set includes the parameters
κ, α, and φ that govern this system.
Equation (1.17) is a simplistic model of the true transition function for beach width.
Sand erosion and accretion are complex processes that are governed by complicated
longshore sediment transport equations that include variables such as sand grain size,
shore profile, and prevailing currents (Van Wellen, Chadwick, and Mason, 2000). How-
6Poor et al (2001) show that objective measures of environmental quality perform as well as subjective
measures in explain home prices.
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ever, because consumers are unlikely to have a sophisticated understanding of the fac-
tors that influence beach width, Equation (1.17) may nonetheless represent an appro-
priate model of consumers’ beliefs. Furthermore, this reduced form model is consistent
with the necessary conditions stated in Theorem 2—in particular, that beach width may
be affected by a policy intervention but otherwise follows a Markov process.
To generate an estimate of consumers’ beliefs about next-period beach width for every
neighborhood-by-year observation, I estimate Equation (1.17) using OLS, using panel
data on beach width and the timing and location of nourishment projects. I then use
the estimated coefficients to predict beach width in the following period (wˆn,t+1), as
follows:
wˆn,t+1 ≡ κ+ αwnt + φNn,t+1 (1.18)
Step 3: Estimate Willingness To Pay Using Nearest Neighbor Matching
The goal of the discontinuity matching procedure is to develop an estimate of the cross-
sectional partial derivative of current housing prices with respect to current beach
width, for matched neighborhoods with beaches that are predicted to have the same
beach width in the following period. Under Theorem 2, this derivative has an inter-
pretation as marginal willingness to pay for an extra year of improved beach width. To
explain the nearest neighbor matching procedure that I use to estimate this derivative,
I adopt the Rubin potential outcomes framework (Rubin, 1974; Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983).
Suppose that at the beginning of year t, consumers believe that the beach near neigh-
borhood nwill be wˆn,t+1 feet wide in year t+1. Based on the model of beliefs presented
in Equation (1.17), there are only two ways that this could happen: either the beach is
nourished at the beginning of year t + 1, or it is not. Let Nn,t+1 be a binary treatment
variable that takes value 1 if beach nourishment occurs at neighborhood n in year t+1,
and 0 otherwise. Now, let wnt(1) and wnt(0) denote the two potential outcomes for
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beach width at beach n in year t, depending on the value of the treatment Nn,t+1. For
example, wnt(1) denotes beach width in neighborhood n and year t when the beach in
this neighborhood is nourished in year t + 1 (i.e., Nn,t+1 = 1). Similarly, let Pnt(1) and
Pnt(0) be the two potential outcomes for the housing price index in neighborhood n in
year t, where again the treatmentNn,t+1 ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether nourishment occurs
in neighborhood n in year t+ 1.
Casting the problem in this potential outcomes terminology is counterintuitive, given
that the actual observed outcomes wnt and Pnt are determined before the beach nourish-
ment project takes place in year t+1. Furthermore, given that next-period nourishment
is more likely at beaches that are currently eroded, it would appear that the treatment
Nn,t+1 is a function of the observed outcome wnt, not vice versa. The resolution of this
apparent contradiction relies on the memorylessness property of Markov models. To
understand the intuition, adopt for the moment the perspective of an observer under
a “veil of ignorance”, to whom only wˆn,t+1 is observable. For this observer, learning
the two potential outcomes that beach width could have taken in period t would add
no additional information about whether the beach is nourished in year t+ 1. In other
words, conditional only on predicted next period width, whether the beach was nour-
ished in year t is as good as randomly assigned—which means that the outcomes can
be viewed in a quasi-experimental framework.
More formally, consider the two key conditions required for a matching estimator to
generate the same consistent inference as a randomized experiment: (i) the probability
that any particular unit is assigned to the treatment group must be greater than zero
and less than one; and (ii) conditional on observable covariates, the treatment must
be independent of the potential outcomes (Abadie and Imbens, 2011). Condition (i)
is clearly satisfied by limiting the sample of neighborhoods to those with at least one
beach nourishment in one year. The argument that condition (ii) is satisfied requires
an assumption about the characteristics of neighborhoods that receive beach nourish-
ment. In particular, it requires that there are no omitted variables that are correlated
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with both beach width and housing prices. For the remainder of the analysis, I assume
that this assumption—that conditional on the covariate wˆn,t+1, the treatment Nn,t+1 is
independent of the potential outcomes wnt(1) and wnt(0)—is true.
Given the potential outcomes defined above, I now follow Abadie and Imbens (2011)
and develop nearest neighbor matching estimators for the treatment effects of next-
period nourishment on current beach width and current housing price indices. Con-
sider first the population average treatment effect for the subpopulation of treated
units (PATT) for current beach width:
PATTw = E[wnt(1)− wnt(0)|Nn,t+1 = 1] (1.19)
Because both wt(1) and wt(0) cannot both be observed for the same unit, I use a nearest
neighbor matching strategy to estimate the unobserved outcomes. This procedure se-
lects, for each treated unit, the set of k untreated units that are most similar on the basis
of a vector of matching variablesXnt that includes wˆn,t+1. The comparison of similarity
between a treated unit and an untreated unit is based on a distance metric calculated
as the norm of the vector of differences between the vectors of matching variables for
the treated and untreated unit. Let Ωnt denote the set of k untreated units that are near-
est neighbors for treated observation nt. I estimate the unobserved potential outcomes
wnt(0) as:
ˆˆwnt(0) =
∑
m∈Ωnt
1
k
wmt (1.20)
for units nt for which Nn,t+1 = 1. I then use this estimated potential width outcome to
create a matching estimator for the PATT:
P̂ATTw =
1
q
·
∑
nt:Nn,t+1=1
(wnt(1)− ˆˆwnt(0)) (1.21)
where q represents the number of treated observations, i.e., observations nt for which
Nn,t+1 = 1.
I use a similar procedure to estimate the PATT for the price index. I define the PATT as:
PATTP = E[Pnt(1)− Pnt(0)|Nn,t+1 = 1] (1.22)
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I then estimate the unobserved potential price outcomes for treated units as:
ˆˆ
Pnt(0) =
∑
m∈Ωnt
1
k
Pmt (1.23)
and the PATT as:
P̂ATT P =
1
q
·
∑
nt:Nn,t+1=1
(Pnt(1)− ˆˆPnt(0)) (1.24)
Now return to the problem of estimating the pre-nourishment cross-sectional relation-
ship between housing prices and beach width. A natural way to estimate the derivative
of price with respect to width, evaluated at the potential width outcome wt(0) in year
t, is:
∂̂p
∂wt
∣∣
wt(0)
= E
[
Pt(1)− Pt(0)
wt(1)− wt(0)
]
=
P̂ATT P
P̂ATTw
(1.25)
1.6 Results
In this section I present the main empirical results from my analysis. I begin with the
results from the repeat sales research design.
1.6.1 Repeat Sales Results
To establish a baseline against which to compare later results, Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 1.4 present the results from “conventional” OLS hedonic regressions of log sales
price on housing characteristics and semi-parametric beach width dummy variables.
Column (1) presents results for all properties; Column (2) presents results for only
properties with repeat sales. These regression control for year-by-county and year-by-
housing type (condo vs single family) fixed effects, but do not include property fixed
effects. The coefficients show that prices increase with beach width, at least for beaches
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less than 300 feet wide. For example, Column (2) shows that a house located on a beach
that is 0 to 49 feet wide has a sale price that is 5.4 percent lower than a house located
on a beach that is 200 to 249 feet wide.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.4 show results from similar regressions based on a
repeat-sales approach. Unlike the conventional OLS regressions, the repeat sales re-
gressions include property fixed effects that control for idiosyncratic characteristics of
each individual house or condo. These regressions show a much more modest rela-
tionship between sales price and beach width. A house in the 0-49 foot category sells
for a statistically insignificant 1.9 percent less than a house in the 200-249 foot category.
Figure 1.4 compares the conventional and repeat-sales coefficients from Columns (2)
and (3) of Table 1.4. The figure emphasizes the fact that the conventional results over-
state the relationship between price and width, relative to the repeat sales approach.
Although both approaches suggest that houses with less than 100 feet of beach expe-
rience a modest price discount, the magnitude of this discount is much greater in the
conventional coefficients.
Figure 1.5 presents an alternative repeat-sales specification, based on a more detailed
set of 10-foot beach width bins. The figure confirms the general patterns from the main
repeat-sales analysis. However, the point estimates from this figure show that homes
located with less than 20 feet of beach sell for a price discount of between 6 and 14
percent, compared to houses with 200 feet of beach. This discount is highly suggestive,
but only marginally statistically significant.
1.6.2 Differences-in-Differences Results
Assessment of Research Design
Before presenting the main differences-in-differences results, I present evidence on the
appropriateness of the research design. One important question is whether the tim-
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Table 1.4: Housing Prices and Beach Width: Panel Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Width: 0 ft -0.045* (0.022) -0.054* (0.024) -0.019 (0.020) -0.022 (0.019)
Width: 50 ft -0.029 (0.017) -0.032 (0.018) -0.021 (0.013) -0.007 (0.013)
Width: 100 ft 0.007 (0.014) -0.004 (0.015) -0.023* (0.009) -0.020 (0.010)
Width: 150 ft -0.015 (0.013) -0.019 (0.011) -0.014 (0.008) -0.010 (0.008)
Width: 250 ft 0.004 (0.015) 0.018 (0.017) 0.015 (0.013) 0.011 (0.012)
Width: 300 ft 0.066* (0.030) 0.042 (0.030) -0.012 (0.026) -0.024 (0.028)
Width: 350 ft 0.014 (0.017) 0.010 (0.019) -0.020 (0.035) -0.037 (0.034)
Width: 400 ft 0.014 (0.032) -0.005 (0.026) 0.011 (0.032) 0.002 (0.033)
Width: 450 ft 0.007 (0.049) 0.025 (0.066) -0.009 (0.042) -0.045 (0.046)
Width: 500 ft -0.005 (0.049) -0.014 (0.049) -0.025 (0.044) -0.044 (0.045)
Non-vacant 0.198*** (0.052) 0.130 (0.073) 0.175** (0.053) 0.137* (0.054)
Renovated 0.105** (0.034) 0.150*** (0.040) -0.020 (0.029) 0.013 (0.034)
Log Acreage 0.095* (0.045) 0.087 (0.050)
Total Area (sq ft) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
Bedrooms 0.103*** (0.012) 0.098*** (0.015)
Bathrooms -0.004 (0.018) -0.007 (0.022)
Effective Year Built 0.006*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.002)
Actual Year Built 0.002* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Structure Quality (1-6) 0.007 (0.012) 0.007 (0.015)
Brick Construction -0.093*** (0.022) -0.104*** (0.027)
Extra Features Value -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Sales 57,199 23,547 23,547 23,547
Clusters 64 64 64 64
R-squared 0.779 0.792 0.629 0.582
Year-Area FE No No No Yes
Year-County FE Yes Yes Yes No
Year-Housing Type FE Yes Yes Yes No
County FE Yes Yes No No
Parcel FE No No Yes Yes
Repeat Sales Only No Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents coefficients and standard errors from a regression of log sales price on beach
width. Column (1) shows a conventional hedonic analysis based on all available sales transactions,
and Column (2) shows a conventional hedonic analysis based only on sales at houses with two or
more sales. Columns (3) and (4) show results from a fixed-effects repeat-sales analysis corresponding
to equation (1.11). In all specifications, each observation represents a unique housing sale between
1983 and 2009, for which beach width data was available, at a house within 20 meters of the beach.
Standard errors are clustered by six-mile zone, and regressions are weighted at the same level. *
denotes p<.05; ** denotes p<.01; *** denotes p<.001.
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Figure 1.4: Panel Regression Results: Capitalized Price Versus Beach Width
Note: This figure plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from Table 1.4. The top panel
presents the conventional OLS hedonic estimates from Column (2) of Table 1.4, and bottom panel
presents the repeat-sales estimates from Column (3). The dependent variable in both specifications is log
sales price. The omitted width category is 200 feet. The figure is based on the set of housing transactions
at properties located within 20 meters of the beach.
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Figure 1.5: Panel Regression Results: Capitalized Price Versus Beach Width, Detail
Note: This figure plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for a repeat sales regression sim-
ilar to Equation (1.11), but with the beach width variable divided into 10 foot bins. The dependent
variable is log sales price, and the figure is based on the set of housing transactions at properties located
within 20 meters of the beach. The omitted width category is 200 feet.
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Table 1.5: Characteristics of Properties Sold Before and After Nourishment
Two Years One Year Year of One Year
Before Before Nourishment After
Condo 0.68 (0.03) 0.69 (0.03) 0.69 (0.03) 0.69 (0.03)
Parcel Acreage 0.63 (0.07) 0.60 (0.08) 0.59 (0.07) 0.66 (0.08)
Housing Area (sq ft) 2,555 (161) 2,424 (145) 2,385 (152) 2,698 (194)
Bedrooms 1.56 (0.10) 1.46 (0.10) 1.42 (0.09) 1.47 (0.09)
Bathrooms 1.22 (0.09) 1.13 (0.09) 1.11 (0.09) 1.14 (0.09)
Year Renovated 1987.0 (0.8) 1986.5 (0.9) 1986.9 (0.8) 1986.7 (0.9)
Year Built 1979.8 (0.8) 1979.1 (0.9) 1978.8 (0.9) 1979.9 (0.8)
Structure Quality (1-6) 3.41 (0.07) 3.35 (0.07) 3.33 (0.07) 3.33 (0.07)
Brick Construction 0.21 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02) 0.21 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02)
Features Appraised Value 15,556 (2,951) 9,782 (1,715) 24,802 (12,771) 17,789* (3,406)
Sale Price (000s) 685 (132) 745 (160) 844 (169) 779 (144)
Beach Width (ft) 199 (9) 180 (7) 261*** (7) 250*** (7)
Major Nourishments 0.02** (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Intensity (cy/ft) 2.97* (1.24) 0.34 (0.13) 56.70*** (1.62) 0.34 (0.14)
neighborhoods 294 303 317 317
Note: This table shows means and standard errors of the characteristics of properties sold
in the years before and after beach nourishment, for properties located within 20 meters of
the beach. The table includes pre and post data for each nourishment project with intensity
greater than 25 cy/ft. Each observation represents the mean characteristics for a one-mile
neighborhood in a particular year. The t-tests are based on unpaired, two-tailed comparisons,
relative to the one year before nourishment category. * denotes p<.05; ** denotes p<.01; ***
denotes p<.001.
ing of beach nourishment projects is related to the characteristics of parcels that are
sold. For the differences-in-differences design to be valid, nourishment must not be
correlated with unobservable parcel characteristics. Although this criterion is funda-
mentally untestable, it is more likely to be true if nourishment is uncorrelated with
observable property characteristics.
Table 1.5 summarizes the characteristics of parcels that are sold in the two years
before and after nourishment. The table shows that housing characteristics are
strongly balanced before and after nourishment. Across a variety of characteristics—
including vacancy, parcel acreage, living area, year built, and number of bedrooms
and bathrooms—there are no statistically significant differences in pre- and post- char-
acteristics. The primary characteristics that do show a significant relationship with
nourishment timing are are beach width, nourishment status, and nourishment inten-
sity.
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Figure 1.6: Trend in Sales Price, by Year of Most Recent Nourishment
Note: The figure plots mean log sale price over time for properties located within 20 meters of the beach,
by the five-year period in which the beach near each survey monument was last nourished. Means are
calculated across all one-mile neighborhood-by-year observations. The figure excludes areas that were
not nourished between 1983 and 2009.
Another important test of a differences-in-differences design is whether the control
group has a similar pre-intervention trend to the treatment group. Figure 1.6 plots the
aggregate trend in the neighborhood housing price indices for six groups, based on the
most recent five-year period in which the beach was nourished. The figure shows that
homes in these different categories do experience very similar price trends. However,
the data are somewhat noisy, suggesting that it may be important to control for for
other sources of variation, such as county-by-year price trends.
A final criterion for the research design is whether the intervention has a meaningful
effect, i.e., whether nourishment increases beach width. Table 1.6 presents the results
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Table 1.6: Beach Width and Nourishment
(1)
Nourishment, 5 years before -4.08 (7.35)
Nourishment, 4 years before -22.75** (6.60)
Nourishment, 3 years before -12.58* (6.11)
Nourishment, 2 years before -19.54** (6.27)
Nourishment, 1 year before -38.28*** (6.77)
Nourishment 45.43*** (4.83)
Nourishment, 1 year after 31.32*** (4.35)
Nourishment, 2 years after 17.82*** (4.25)
Nourishment, 3 years after 17.86** (6.02)
Nourishment, 4 years after 21.49** (7.65)
Observations 34,243
Clusters 61
R-squared 0.149
Elapsed Year-Base Year FE Yes
Elapsed Year-Location FE Yes
Note: This table presents coefficients and standard errors from the
differences-in-differences regression corresponding to equation (1.15).
The dependent variable is beach width, in feet. Each observation repre-
sents a unique one-mile neighborhood and year between 1983 and 2009,
for which beach width data was available. Standard errors are clustered
by six-mile zone, and regressions are weighted at the same level. * de-
notes p<.05; ** denotes p<.01; *** denotes p<.001.
from estimating Equation (1.15), which compares the width of beaches that are nour-
ished and unnourished in a particular year. The table shows that nourishment causes a
sharp, highly significant increase in width. Compared to the previous year, the average
section of beach gains 83 feet in width in the year of nourishment (with a 95 percent
confidence interval of 59 to 97 feet). Overall, the coefficients show an intuitive pattern:
the beach erodes in the years before nourishment, gains considerable width in the year
of nourishment, and then continues eroding.
As a further test of the nourishment intervention, Table 1.7 shows the results from esti-
mating the change in beach width as a function nourishment intensity (cubic yards of
sand placed per foot of beach). The table shows results for three intensity categories,
25 to 49 cy/ft, 50 to 74 cy/ft and >75 cy/ft, relative to the omitted category of no
nourishment (results for the 1-24 cy/ft category are similar but not shown). The coef-
ficients show that changes in width are strongly increasing in nourishment intensity.
For example, nourishments in the 25-49 cy/ft category cause the beach to increase by
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an additional 57 feet, whereas nourishments in the >75 cy/ft category cause the beach
to increase by an additional 121 feet.
Main Differences-in-Differences Results
Table 1.8 shows the results of estimating Equation (1.14), which compares the housing
price index for one-mile neighborhoods located near beaches that are nourished or
unnourished in a particular year. To allow for the possibility that beach width may
be more important for houses located closer to the beach, the table presents separate
results for properties in three different distance categories: 0 to 19 meters from the
beach, 20 to 799 meters from the beach, and 800 to 5,000 meters from the beach.
The regression results in all three categories reveal a consistent pattern: nourishment
projects have no effect on sales prices. For example, for parcels located directly on the
beach (the 0-19 meters category), the coefficients imply that housing prices increase by
a statistically insignificant 1.2 percent between two years before nourishment and the
year after of nourishment, with a 95 percent confidence interval of -2.5 percent to +4.9
percent. To illustrate the results, Figure 1.7 plots changes in beach width and changes
in housing prices (in the 0-19 m category), relative to the number of years elapsed since
nourishment. The figure emphasizes the fact that although nourishment causes a sharp
change in beach width, it has no immediate effect on housing prices.
Table 1.9 presents the results of an alternative differences-in-differences specification
that compares the change in prices accompanying high-intensity nourishments against
the change in prices accompanying low-intensity nourishments. The results again re-
veal that housing prices do not respond to the timing of nourishment projects. As
shown in Figure 1.8, even though higher intensity nourishments cause a greater in-
creases in beach width, these changes in beach width are not reflected in housing
prices, which show no obvious relationship to the timing of nourishment.
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Table 1.7: Beach Width and Nourishment, by Nourishment Intensity
(1)
25-49 cy/ft, 5 years before 1 (10)
25-49 cy/ft, 4 years before -6 (7)
25-49 cy/ft, 3 years before -1 (7)
25-49 cy/ft, 2 years before -4 (7)
25-49 cy/ft, 1 year before -20* (9)
25-49 cy/ft 37*** (5)
25-49 cy/ft, 1 year after 20** (6)
25-49 cy/ft, 2 years after 3 (6)
25-49 cy/ft, 3 years after 3 (7)
25-49 cy/ft, 4 years after 25** (8)
50-74 cy/ft, 5 years before -13 (10)
50-74 cy/ft, 4 years before -28* (11)
50-74 cy/ft, 3 years before -13 (9)
50-74 cy/ft, 2 years before -38*** (6)
50-74 cy/ft, 1 year before -53*** (10)
50-74 cy/ft 40*** (8)
50-74 cy/ft, 1 year after 22** (7)
50-74 cy/ft, 2 years after 14* (5)
50-74 cy/ft, 3 years after 12 (7)
50-74 cy/ft, 4 years after 8 (11)
75-up cy/ft, 5 years before -8 (11)
75-up cy/ft, 4 years before -39*** (11)
75-up cy/ft, 3 years before -29* (14)
75-up cy/ft, 2 years before -27 (22)
75-up cy/ft, 1 year before -54*** (10)
75-up cy/ft 67*** (8)
75-up cy/ft, 1 year after 57*** (6)
75-up cy/ft, 2 years after 42*** (7)
75-up cy/ft, 3 years after 36* (14)
75-up cy/ft, 4 years after 32 (17)
Observations 34,243
Clusters 61
R-squared 0.157
Elapsed Year-Base Year FE Yes
Elapsed Year-Location FE Yes
Note: This table presents coefficients and standard errors from
differences-in-differences regression corresponding to equation (1.15),
where the effects of nourishment are disaggregated by intensity into four
categories: 1-24 cy/ft, 25-49 cy/ft, 50-74 cy/ft, and ≥75 cy/ft. The de-
pendent variable is beach width, in feet. Each observation represents
a unique one-mile neighborhood and year between 1983 and 2009, for
which beach width data was available. Standard errors are clustered by
six-mile zone, and regressions are weighted at the same level. * denotes
p<.05; ** denotes p<.01; *** denotes p<.001.
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Table 1.8: Housing Prices and Nourishment: Differences-in-Differences Results
0-19 m 20-799 m 800-5000 m
Nourishment, 5 years before -0.019* -0.014 -0.019
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Nourishment, 4 years before -0.011 -0.017* -0.018**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Nourishment, 3 years before -0.011 -0.013* 0.009
(0.008) (0.006) (0.020)
Nourishment, 2 years before -0.019 -0.015 0.008
(0.014) (0.008) (0.017)
Nourishment, 1 year before -0.023* -0.005 -0.008
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Nourishment -0.016 -0.011 0.001
(0.011) (0.007) (0.012)
Nourishment, 1 year after -0.007 -0.017** 0.010
(0.012) (0.006) (0.014)
Nourishment, 2 years after 0.000 -0.017* 0.000
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Nourishment, 3 years after 0.004 -0.001 0.005
(0.012) (0.007) (0.011)
Nourishment, 4 years after 0.011 0.002 0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011)
Observations 65,071 81,462 82,006
Clusters 61 67 65
R-squared 0.534 0.659 0.468
Elapsed Year-Base Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Elapsed Year-Location FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents coefficients and standard errors from the differences-in-
differences regression corresponding to equation (1.14). The dependent variable is
the log of the sale price index for properties located within 20 meters of the beach.
Each observation represents a unique one-mile neighborhood and year between
1983 and 2009. Standard errors are clustered by six-mile zone, and regressions are
weighted at the same level. * denotes p<.05; ** denotes p<.01; *** denotes p<.001.
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Figure 1.7: Differences-in-Differences Results
Note: The top panel plots 95 percent confidence intervals for the differences-in-differences coefficients
from Table 1.6. The dependent variable is beach width in feet. The bottom panel plots confidence
intervals for the differences-in-differences coefficients from Table 1.8. The dependent variable is log
sales price. The shared x-axis represents the number of years since nourishment, where nourishment
occurs in year 0. The figure is based on the set of properties located within 20 meters of the upper end
of the beach.
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Table 1.9: Housing Prices and Nourishment: Diff-in-Diff Results by Intensity
0-19 m 20-799 m 800-5000 m
25-49 cy/ft, 5 years before -0.025 (0.013) -0.012 (0.010) -0.009 (0.007)
25-49 cy/ft, 4 years before -0.024* (0.011) -0.017 (0.014) -0.018* (0.008)
25-49 cy/ft, 3 years before -0.031** (0.010) -0.023** (0.008) -0.022* (0.009)
25-49 cy/ft, 2 years before -0.011 (0.013) 0.002 (0.011) -0.016 (0.010)
25-49 cy/ft, 1 year before -0.017 (0.012) 0.002 (0.010) -0.004 (0.008)
25-49 cy/ft -0.011 (0.020) -0.015 (0.012) -0.021* (0.010)
25-49 cy/ft, 1 year after -0.003 (0.019) -0.018* (0.008) -0.011 (0.008)
25-49 cy/ft, 2 years after -0.000 (0.015) -0.017 (0.010) -0.001 (0.008)
25-49 cy/ft, 3 years after 0.012 (0.017) 0.008 (0.013) -0.011 (0.008)
25-49 cy/ft, 4 years after 0.020 (0.012) 0.017 (0.013) 0.004 (0.008)
50-74 cy/ft, 5 years before -0.004 (0.020) 0.001 (0.009) 0.005 (0.009)
50-74 cy/ft, 4 years before -0.023 (0.018) -0.006 (0.008) -0.015 (0.010)
50-74 cy/ft, 3 years before 0.006 (0.012) 0.002 (0.010) -0.014 (0.009)
50-74 cy/ft, 2 years before -0.035 (0.022) -0.031* (0.015) -0.006 (0.008)
50-74 cy/ft, 1 year before -0.039* (0.016) -0.003 (0.020) -0.007 (0.009)
50-74 cy/ft -0.023 (0.012) -0.005 (0.011) -0.019* (0.010)
50-74 cy/ft, 1 year after -0.023 (0.015) -0.013 (0.011) -0.016 (0.014)
50-74 cy/ft, 2 years after 0.006 (0.017) -0.015 (0.011) -0.029 (0.014)
50-74 cy/ft, 3 years after -0.007 (0.014) 0.000 (0.011) -0.008 (0.009)
50-74 cy/ft, 4 years after 0.008 (0.015) -0.005 (0.012) -0.013 (0.016)
75-up cy/ft, 5 years before -0.018 (0.017) -0.009 (0.013) -0.004 (0.020)
75-up cy/ft, 4 years before 0.037 (0.025) -0.023 (0.014) -0.000 (0.012)
75-up cy/ft, 3 years before 0.005 (0.023) -0.005 (0.011) 0.010 (0.014)
75-up cy/ft, 2 years before 0.027 (0.021) -0.013 (0.016) -0.001 (0.014)
75-up cy/ft, 1 year before -0.005 (0.019) 0.002 (0.009) 0.010 (0.018)
75-up cy/ft 0.001 (0.019) 0.004 (0.016) 0.020* (0.008)
75-up cy/ft, 1 year after -0.004 (0.021) -0.014 (0.013) 0.015 (0.011)
75-up cy/ft, 2 years after -0.024* (0.011) -0.017 (0.011) -0.001 (0.011)
75-up cy/ft, 3 years after -0.008 (0.026) -0.019* (0.009) -0.012 (0.016)
75-up cy/ft, 4 years after -0.007 (0.017) -0.024 (0.018) -0.013 (0.020)
Observations 65,071 81,462 82,006
Clusters 61 67 65
R-squared 0.530 0.660 0.496
Elapsed Year-Base Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Elapsed Year-Location FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents coefficients and standard errors from the differences-in-differences
regression corresponding to equation (1.14), where the effects of nourishment are disaggre-
gated by intensity into four categories: 1-24 cy/ft, 25-49 cy/ft, 50-74 cy/ft, and≥75 cy/ft.. The
dependent variable is the log of the sale price index for properties located within 20 meters
of the beach. Each observation represents a unique one-mile neighborhood and year between
1983 and 2009. Standard errors are clustered by six-mile zone, and regressions are weighted
at the same level. * denotes p<.05; ** denotes p<.01; *** denotes p<.001.
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Figure 1.8: Differences-in-Differences Results by Nourishment Intensity
Note: The top panel plots the differences-in-differences coefficients from Table 1.7. The dependent vari-
able is beach width in feet. The bottom panel plots the differences-in-differences coefficients from Table
1.9. The dependent variable is log sales price index for houses located within 20 meters of the beach.
The shared x-axis represents the number of years since nourishment, where nourishment occurs in year
0. The intensity categories represent the quantity of sand placed on the beach, in cubic yards, per foot of
shoreline. Both panels present coefficients relative to sections of beach that are not nourished in year 0.
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Table 1.10: Beach Width Markov Regression Results
(1) (2A) (2B) (2C) (2D) (2E)
Width, year -1 0.91*** 0.93*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.82*** 0.88***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Major Nourishment 66.44*** 68.00*** 87.00*** 59.53*** 41.14 37.29**
(6.62) (16.80) (10.16) (4.69) (17.21) (7.97)
Constant 16.62*** 15.12*** 15.51** 15.98** 40.38** 27.08*
(3.21) (2.68) (5.01) (4.65) (6.70) (7.50)
Observations 4,342 1,534 1,820 572 156 260
Clusters 50 33 30 12 4 6
R-squared 0.850 0.880 0.834 0.840 0.689 0.810
Note: This table presents the coefficients from estimating equation (1.17), with stan-
dard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is current beach width, in feet.
Column (1) includes all observations. Columns (2A) through (2E) include the set
of beaches that are nourished 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 times, respectively, during the period
from 1983 to 2009. In all models, standard errors are clustered by six-mile zones. *
denotes p<.05; ** denotes p<.01; *** denotes p<.001.
1.6.3 Discontinuity Matching Results
The discontinuity matching procedure includes two substantive components: develop-
ing a rational model of beliefs about future beach width, and using a nearest neighbor
matching procedure to calculate the treatment effect of future beach nourishment on
current beach width and housing prices.
Table 1.10 shows the results of of estimating a model of beliefs about beach width
corresponding to Equation (1.17). Column (1) represents the simplest possible AR(1)
specification, in which beach width is modeled as a function of lagged beach width, a
binary nourishment variable, and a constant. The results indicate that beach width is
highly autocorrelated, with a coefficient of .91 on lagged width, and that nourishment
causes a 66 foot increase in beach width. The coefficients are very precisely estimated.
Columns (2A) through (2E) show the results of estimating separate results for beaches
with 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 nourishments, respectively, during the period from 1983 to 2009.
The rationale for estimating separate regressions is that beaches that erode at faster
rates may also be nourished more frequently. The regressions results confirm this hy-
pothesis: the coefficient on lagged width decreases from .93 and .91 at beaches with 1
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or 2 nourishments to .82 and .88 at beaches with 4 or 5 nourishments. Furthermore,
the effects of nourishment on beach width are larger at beaches that are nourished less
frequently.
Figure (1.9) illustrates the results from the matching stage of the discontinuity match-
ing procedure. The top panel shows how beach width evolves over time for two groups
of neighborhood-by-year observations: neighborhoods that are nourished (“treated
units”), and similar unnourished neighborhoods that are predicted to have similar
beach width in the following year (“control units”). The panel shows that the treated
and control neighborhoods have reasonably similar beach width in the year of nour-
ishment, as would be expected, given that these units are matched on predicted width
for that year. In subsequent years, the treated and control groups also show similar
trends, which is encouraging and suggests that the Markov assumption underlying
the discontinuity matching approach is valid. However, in the year before nourish-
ment, the treated neighborhoods show a substantial decline in beach width relative to
the control group. From the perspective of the discontinuity matching procedure, this
decline is the treatment effect of nourishment on pre-nourishment beach width.
The second panel of Figure (1.9) shows similar results for the effect of nourishment
on pre-nourishment housing prices. Again, the panel shows that the treatment and
control groups have similar values of the price index in the year of nourishment, and
experience similar post-nourishment price trends. Unlike the width results, however,
the panel shows that there is no discernable effect of nourishment on pre-nourishment
housing prices. In other words, the treatment effect of predictable future beach nour-
ishments on current housing prices is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Table 1.11 presents estimates of the population average treatment effects on the treated
from Equations (1.21) and (1.24). These estimates confirm the qualitative results from
Figure (1.9) . Although next-period nourishment is associated with a highly significant
60 foot decrease in current beach width, it is linked to an insignificant decrease of $1,729
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Figure 1.9: Discontinuity Matching Results: Trends in Width and Price
Note: This figure shows trends in the outcome variable for the treatment and control groups for the
discontinuity matching procedure. In both panels, the treatment variable is nourishment in elapsed
year 0, and the matching variable is predicted width in elapsed year 0, based on information available
in year −1. The upper panel shows actual width and the lower panel shows the actual price index for
properties located within 20 meters of the beach.
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Table 1.11: Discontinuity Matching Results
Outcome Coefficient Std Err 95% Confidence Interval
PATT, width -60 4 -67 -53
PATT, sale price -1,729 8,808 -18,992 15,535
∂P/∂w 29 . . .
Note: This table presents nearest neighbor matching results corresponding to Equations (1.21) and (1.24).
Each observation represents a unique one-mile neighborhood and year. Unobserved potential outcomes
for nourished beaches are estimated using the 6 closest unnourished observations. The vector of match
variables includes predicted next-period beach width, year, and the total number of nourishments oc-
curing at each beach. Matching is exact on the year variable, and the standard errors are robust. The
table also shows the result of estimating Equation (1.25). To avoid being misleading, standard errors
and confidence intervals are not shown for this estimate, which represents the ratio of two random vari-
ables with an unknown degree of correlation. The figure is based on the set of housing transactions at
properties located within 20 meters of the beach.
in the current housing price index. Combining these two treatment effects suggests
that the average homeowner is willing to pay $29 to rent an extra foot of beach for one
year. Because this estimate represent the ratio of two random variables with possibly
correlated distributions, I do not calculate a standard error or a confidence interval.
However, the significant uncertainties in the treatment effect for price suggest it would
be difficult to reject the null hypothesis that willingness to pay is $0.
1.7 Discussion and Policy Implications
1.7.1 Summary of Main Results
The empirical results from the previous section are striking. Using three different re-
search designs, I find consistent evidence that homeowners place little value on the
width of coastal beaches. The repeat-sales regressions suggest a statistically signfi-
cant positive effect of beach width on prices, but the effect is small, and only holds
for houses located on beaches that are less than 250 feet wide. Furthermore, because
these panel regressions do not control for factors that change over time within neigh-
borhoods (e.g., wealth, political influence), there is a possibility that the direction of
causality runs from prices to beach width, not vice versa. In contrast, based on the
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differences-in-differences regressions and the discontinuity matching results, I am un-
able to reject the null hypothesis that homeowners’ willingness to pay to avoid coastal
shoreline loss is zero.7 Since these two research designs are based on sharp variation in
beach width caused by nourishment projects, they are more likely to identify the true
causal effect of width on price.
However, the results also suggest a second important finding: the marginal benefits of
an extra foot of beach may be highly nonlinear. The repeat-sales results show that the
relationship between housing prices and beach width is only positive for houses with
less than 250 feet of beach. Furthermore, houses with extremely eroded beaches sell
for a substantial discount. In particular, the point estimates indicate that houses with
less than 20 feet of remaining beach have sales prices that are 6 to 14 percent lower
than houses with 200 feet of beach. Because the repeat sales design has weaknesses,
and because I observe relatively few homes located on beaches with such high levels
of erosion, this conclusion should not be overemphasized. Nonetheless, it suggests the
possibility that the welfare costs of sea level rise may be low up to a threshold, and
then increase sharply.
1.7.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Beach Nourishment
Setting aside any nonlinearities in the marginal benefits schedule, and ignoring the
fact that only the repeat-sales coefficients are significantly different than zero, consider
the following back-of-the-envelope calculations based on a literal interpretation of the
point estimates from the results section. Table 1.12 presents the results of a simple
break-even cost benefit analysis of the decision to nourish a section of beach. As the ta-
ble shows, the differences-in-differences and repeat-sales point estimates indicate that
7This finding is particularly striking in light of the large amount of money that has been spent on
beach nourishment over the last 50 years (U.S. ACE, 1996). However, historically, beach nourishment
has been heavily subsidized by the U.S. and Florida governments, with local communities paying less
than half of the actual cost of beach nourishment (NRC, 1995; U.S. ACE, 1996). Thus, the decision to
nourish a particular beach may not be a valid measure of a local community’s revealed willingness to
pay for wider beaches.
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Table 1.12: Willingness to Pay for Wider Beaches
Research Design WTP metric ∂P/∂w Value of 70 foot Break-even
nourishment HH per mile
Repeat Sales, <250 feet One foot nourishment $68 $4,760 210
Differences-in-Differences One foot nourishment $42 $2,927 342
Discontinuity Matching One foot rental $29 $13,685 73
Note: The table summarizes point estimates of willingness to pay for wider beaches based on the three
research designs. The “WTP metric” column describes the correct welfare interepretation of each esti-
mate of ∂P/∂w. These calculations are based on a $500,000 home. The “Value of 70 foot nourishment”
column presents an estimate of the value per household of a 70 foot beach nourishment. For the discon-
tinuity matching estimates, this nourishment is assumed to have a lifetime of 10 years, during which
beach width decays following the model presented in Table 1.10. The “Break-even HH per mile” col-
umn describes the number of housesholds that would have to be located on a one-mile section of beach
in order for the marginal benefits of nourishment to exceed the $1,000,000 nourishment cost per mile.
Note that this break-even analysis does not consider other contributions that beach nourishment makes
to local economies. Also note that the results apply only to properties located within 20 meters of the
beach. Finally, note that these calculations are based on point estimates, and that 95 percent confidence
intervals are consistent with a broader range of possible willingness-to-pay values.
willingness to pay for a one-foot beach nourishment project is between $42 and $68
(based on a $500,000 home). This implies that a project that adds 70 feet of width to
a beach would generate benefits of $2,927 to $4,760 per household. Since the cost of
beach nourishment is roughly $1,000,000 per mile, there would have to be between
210 and 342 beachfront homes per mile in order for the project to generate positive
marginal benefits. Note, of course, that this simple break-even analysis ignores any
benefits that beach nourishment may generate for non-beachfront properties or for the
local economy (e.g., revenues from tourism).8
Point estimates based on the discontinuity matching procedure produce somewhat
larger results (again, with the caveat that the numbers are not statistically distinguish-
able from zero). Assuming a decay rate of .91 and a constant of 16.5, the Markov
regression results from Table 1.10 suggest that the average beach has a stable equilib-
rium of approximately 183 feet of width. For a nourishment project that adds 70 feet
to the beach, the overall contribution to beach width during the first ten years (a typ-
ical nourishment interval) is 474 foot-years. At a marginal value of $29 per foot-year,
8To put these numbers in perspective, heavily developed areas (e.g., Miami Beach) with many high
rise buildings might have over a thousand condos and apartments per mile of beach. Less developed
areas might have fewer than fifty single-family homes.
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this implies that willingness to pay for a nourishment project is $13,685 per house-
hold. A comparison against the $1,000,000 per mile cost of nourishment implies that
there would have to be 73 beachfront houses per mile of beach in order for a project to
generate positive marginal benefits, based solely on benefits to coastal homeowners.
1.7.3 Discussion
Overall, my results paint a picture that is both pessimistic and optimistic. On one
hand, the results suggest that because homeowners have relatively low willingness to
pay for wider beaches, the welfare costs of shoreline loss—and more broadly, of sea
level rise—may not be as serious as believed. In particular, my results show that for
a typical section of beach in the normal 100 to 400 foot range, changes in beach width
have little impact on property values. However, the results also hint at the possibility
that damages from shoreline loss are nonlinear. In particular, because houses located
on very eroded beaches appear to experience substantial price discounts relative to
homes on wider beaches, it appears possible that there may exist some threshold below
which shoreline loss does have serious welfare effects. Because the statistical evidence
for this claim is weak, further research is needed.
Additionally, it is important to interpret the overall results of this study in context.
The general lack of price effects implies that changes in beach width do not affect
coastal homeowners’ appraisals of the recreational and use benefits from owning a
beachfront home. However, because there are a variety of housing market inefficien-
cies that could weaken the relationship between prices and beach quality, it is possible
that these revealed preference estimates are not an accurate measure of actual benefits.
For example, homebuyers may choose homes based on long-term beach width, with-
out taking advantage of the arbitrage opportunity to purchase “undervalued” homes
that are experiencing wider than usual beach width. Alternatively, beach width may
not be a salient characteristic at the time of home purchase, even though homebuyers
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would in fact derive more use benefits from a wider beach. Third, there may be nega-
tive externalities, such as crowding by members of the beachgoing public, that cancel
out the benefits of wider beaches. Fourth, homebuyers may have unrealistic or overly
optimistic beliefs about changes in beach width (e.g., even though I know that many
beaches are eroding, I think the beach in front of my new home will accrete instead).
Finally, the general equilibrium effects of widespread shoreline loss may be quite dif-
ferent than the partial equilibrium effects of specific beach nourishment projects—so
that even if a beach nourishment project in a particular location has little effect on hous-
ing prices, the loss of shoreline along the entire Florida coast (as might be caused by
sea level rise) could still have substantial price effects.
In respect to whether the results imply that homeowners do not value the storm pro-
tection benefits provided by wider beaches, the results are even less clear. At least
two alternative explanations are possible. First, homebuyers may suffer from moral
hazard, either because they have purchased insurance that reimburses them for storm-
related damage, or because they believe that state and federal disaster relief programs
will cover their losses. Second, homebuyers may suffer from myopia, in which the
storm protection benefits from a wider beach are not a salient attribute at the time of
purchase (Berger et al, 2009).
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed a new “discontinuity matching” research design
for estimating homeowners’ marginal willingness to pay for time-variant neighbor-
hood characteristics. I use this design, as well as traditional panel and differences-
in-differences approaches, to estimate the welfare costs of shoreline loss along coastal
beaches. In contrast to previous research that suggests that homeowners are willing
to pay a substantial premium to live near wider beaches, I find that changes in beach
width have little effect on the sale price of beachfront homes, except at very eroded
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beaches. The results suggest that policy interventions to prevent shoreline loss are
most valuable near homes that are directly threatened by the ocean.
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Chapter 2:
Crime, Weather, and Climate Change
2.1 Introduction
The short-term effects of weather on crime are well documented. Previous work has
shown that presumably-random variation in daily and weekly temperatures affects the
incidence of both violent and non-violent offenses, with higher temperatures leading
to higher levels of criminal activity (Brunsdon et al, 2009; Bushman, Wang, and Ander-
son, 2005; Cohn, 1990). However, despite the strength of this relationship, there is little
evidence on how weather affects patterns of criminal behavior over longer time scales.
In particular, there is great uncertainty about how climate change is likely to affect the
incidence of crime.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that global temperatures are
likely to rise by about 5 degrees Fahrenheit (2.8 degrees Celsius) by the year 2099,
compared to baseline temperatures during the period from 1980 to 1999 (IPCC, 2007).
Studies of the short-term relationship between crime and weather suggest that such a
change in temperatures could have dramatic effects on crime patterns. However, given
that crime rates exhibit negative serial correlation over the scale of days to weeks (Ja-
cob, Lefgren, and Moretti, 2007), the long-term impacts of climate change on crime may
be considerably smaller than the short-term impacts. The only two previous studies
of the effects of climate change on crime have used highly aggregate data and found
mixed results (Anderson, Bushman, and Groom, 1997; Rotton and Cohn, 2003). To ad-
dress this gap in the literature, in this chapter I use an unusually long and rich panel
dataset to estimate the historical relationship between weather and crime. I then use
this historical relationship to predict how climate change will impact the future preva-
lence of criminal activity in the United States, based on existing simulations of future
weather under the IPCC’s A1B scenario.9
9All climate projections cited in this chapter are based on the IPCC’s A1B scenario. This scenario
represents a future world with high rates of economic growth and substantial convergence between
developing and developed economies, where rapid technological change is based on a balance of fossil-
fuel intensive and non-fossil sources of energy (IPCC, 2000). A1B is a “middle-of-the-road” scenario that
tends to produce emissions and climate results that are intermediate between high emissions scenarios
such as A1FI and low emissions scenarios such as B1.
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To support my analysis, I have constructed a panel dataset that includes monthly crime
and weather data for 2,972 U.S. counties for the period from 1960 to 2009. My data on
criminal activity is drawn from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform
Crime Reporting (UCR) data. These data, which are based on monthly reports from
17,000 U.S. law enforcement agencies, tabulate offenses in nine major categories: mur-
der, manslaughter, rape, aggravated assault, simple assault, robbery, burglary, larceny,
and vehicle theft. I merge this data on crime rates with historical weather data from
the U.S. National Climatic Data Center’s Global Historical Climatology Network Daily
(GHCN-Daily) dataset. The GHCN-Daily weather data include temperature and pre-
cipitation records from 75,000 weather stations worldwide that have been subjected to
a set of quality assurance checks. After combining these two data sources, I generate a
dataset with 1.46 million unique county-by-year-by-month observations.
To identify the effect of daily weather on monthly crime, I use a semi-parametric
weather bin estimator (Deschenes and Greenstone, 2011) and control for county-by-
month and county-by-year fixed effects. The weather bin variables measure the num-
ber of days per month spent in each of ten maximum daily temperature bins (<10
degrees F, 10-20 F, ..., 80-90 F, ≥90 F) and five daily precipitation bins (0 mm, 1-4 mm,
5-14 mm, 15-29 mm, and ≥30 mm). I regress monthly crime rates on these bin vari-
ables, controlling for extensive fixed effects that capture both average crime levels in
each year-by-county set of observations and average monthly patterns of crime and
weather within each county. Finally, I use the results from these regressions to pre-
dict crime rates under the weather patterns likely to be experienced in each decade
between 2010 and 2099, based on projections of future U.S. climate drawn from two
general circulation models.
My analysis makes two main contributions. First, I document a striking relationship
between monthly weather patterns and crime rates. Across a variety of offenses, higher
temperatures cause more crime. For most categories of violent crimes, this relationship
appears approximately linear through the entire range of temperatures experienced
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in in-sample counties. However, for property crimes such as burglary and larceny,
the relationship between temperaure and crime is highly non-linear, with a kink at
approximately 40 degrees F. Above this cutoff, changes in temperature have little effect
on crime rates.
Second, I develop the first detailed predictions of how climate change will affect pat-
terns of criminal activity in the United States. My results suggest that climate change
will cause crime rates to increase substantially. Under the IPCC’s A1B climate sce-
nario, the United States will experience an additional 35,000 murders, 216,000 cases of
rape, 1.6 million aggravated assaults, 2.4 million simple assaults, 409,000 robberies, 3.1
million burglaries, 3.8 million cases of larceny, and 1.4 million cases of vehicle theft,
compared to the total number of offenses that would have occurred between the years
2010 and 2099 in the absence of climate change.10 The present discounted value of the
social costs of these climate-related crimes is between 20 and 68 billion dollars.
I am aware of only two previous empirical studies of the effects of climate change on
crime in the United States: Anderson, Bushman, and Groom (1997), who study the re-
lationship between annual average crimes rates and temperatures, using data for the
United States as a whole; and Rotton and Cohn (2003), who perform a similar analysis
based on state-level annual averages.11 In contrast, my analysis is based on monthly
crime data and daily weather data for 2,972 U.S. counties, and thus is much more likely
to capture important aspects of the relationship between weather and crime. Addition-
ally, as I describe in more detail below, reporting inconsistencies in the FBI’s crime data
add considerable measurement error to interannual comparisons of crime rates. Thus,
by focusing on month-to-month changes in crime rates within a particular county and
year, my analysis solves measurement error issues that have plagued previous work.
10For comparison, I assume that the total baseline number of crimes that will occur in the United
States between 2010 and 2099 will be: 980,000 murders, 5.7 million cases of rape, 52 million aggravated
assaults, 189 million simple assaults, 25 million robberies, 135 million burglaries, 429 million cases of
larceny, and 72 million cases of vehicle theft. These totals are based on the assumption that crime rates
during the next century will be similar to actual crime rates between 2000 and 2009.
11In addition, Simister and Cooper (2005) provide graphical evidence on seasonal variation in U.S.
crime rates.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides background
on the relationship between weather and crime. Section 2.3 describes the primary data
sources, and Section 2.4 discusses my empirical methodology. Section 2.5 presents
my main findings on the relationship between climate change and crime. Section 2.6
discusses the results and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background on Weather and Crime
Researchers have proposed several hypotheses that explain why weather might affect
crime (Cohn, 1990; Agnew, 2012). The first—that weather is a variable in the produc-
tion function for crime—draws on Gary Becker’s canonical model of crime, in which
individuals make decisions about whether to commit criminal acts based on rational
consideration of the costs and benefits (Becker, 1968). In this model, weather conditions
are an input that affects both the probability of successfully completing a crime and the
probability of escaping undetected afterward (Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti, 2007). For
example, pleasant evening weather may increase the number of opportunities for mug-
ging, and dark, rainy nights may increase the probability of successfully burglarizing
a house without being detected.
A second explanation draws on a social interaction theory of crime. Glaeser, Sacerdote,
and Scheinkman (1996) propose that the frequency of criminal acts is driven in large
part by social interactions that occur during day-to-day life. Applied to weather, such
a hypothesis implies that weather conditions that foster social interactions are likely to
increase crime rates (Rotton and Cohn, 2003). For example, mild weather that encour-
ages people to go shopping would also have the effect of increasing the frequency of
property crimes such as larceny.
A third possible explanation draws on theories in which external conditions directly
affect human judgment in ways that cause heightened aggression and loss of con-
trol (Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996; Card and Dahl, 2011). Experimental evidence
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strongly suggests that ambient temperatures affect aggression (Anderson, 1989). For
example, Baron and Bell (1976) assigned male subjects to receive a positive or negative
evaluation from a confederate, and then gave them the opportunity to retaliate with
an elecric shock. They found that retaliation was highest when the experiment took
place in a room with a high ambient temperature (92-95 degrees F), and that retalia-
tion was still heightened even at more moderate temperatures (82-85 degrees F). Such
studies imply that weather may directly influence people’s psychological propensity
to commit violent criminal acts.
Although using empirical data to distinguish between these hypotheses is difficult,
there is considerable evidence that weather does affect criminal behavior (Cohn, 1990).
Previous research on this topic has typically taken one of two empirical approaches.
First, some studies have focused on measuring the short-term relationship between
weather and crime, using hourly, daily, or weekly microdata (Bushman, Wang, and
Anderson, 2005; Cohn and Rotton, 2000). For example, Brunsdon et al (2009) measure
the impact of weather on disorderly conduct using hourly data on police calls in an
urban area of the United Kingdom. They find that disorderly conduct increases with
temperature and humidity but is unaffected by precipitation. However, interpreting
these types of studies in the context of climate change is complicated by negative serial
correlation in crime. In a large study using weekly data on crime and temperatures
in 116 U.S. jurisdictions for the period 1996 to 2001, Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti (2007)
find that although rates of violent crime and property crime are elevated during weeks
with hot weather, the effect is offset somewhat by lower than usual crime rates in the
following weeks. This result suggests that understanding the cumulative impacts of
climate change on crime may require working with data at a more aggregate time scale
(e.g., months). Simister and Cooper (2005) conduct such an analysis for Los Angeles,
using monthly assault and weather data from 1988 to 2002. Based on regressions that
include linear and quadratic effects, they find evidence of a strong linear relationship
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between assault and temperature.12
The second main empirical approach in the literature is to use yearly data to measure
how weather affects crime at the national or state levels. For example, authors have ex-
amined the time series relationship between annual average crimes rates and average
temperatures, for the United States as a whole (Anderson, Bushman, and Groom, 1997)
and for a panel of states (Rotton and Cohn, 2003). These studies have found mixed re-
sults, possibily due to the a lack of geographic and spatial resolution in the crime and
weather data. Another issue with this work is that U.S. aggregate crime statistics suffer
from known quality issues, with different data sources implying considerably different
trends in crime rates in the 1970s and 1980s (Levitt, 2004). As a result, analyses based
on such geographically-aggregate annual data may face econometric issues with mea-
surement error.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data Sources
The analysis for this chapter is based on an unusually long and rich panel dataset of
monthly crime rates and weather for 2,972 counties in the 49 continental states (includ-
ing the District of Columbia). The dataset covers the 50-year period from 1960 to 2009,
and contains 1.46 million unique county-by-year-by-month observations. It is based on
two primary sources: Uniform Crime Reporting data from the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI, 2011a), and Global Historical Climatology Network Daily weather
data from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC Climate Services Branch, 2011).
The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data are the longest continuously-collected
historical record of criminal activity in the United States. These data are based on
12Simister (2002) and Simister and Van de Vliert (2005) find evidence of an approximately linear re-
lationship between temperature and murder in a similar analysis using national-level monthly data on
weather and murder for Pakistan.
71
Table 2.1: Uniform Crime Reporting Offense Definitions
Offense Definition
Murder The willful (nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another.
Manslaughter The killing of another person through gross negligence.
Rape The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.
Aggravated Assault An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting
severe or aggravated bodily injury.
Simple Assault Assaults which do not involve the use of a firearm, knife, cutting instrument,
or other dangerous weapon and in which the victim did not sustain serious
or aggravated injuries.
Robbery The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody,
or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence
or by putting the victim in fear.
Burglary The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft.
Larceny The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from the
possession or constructive possession of another.
Vehicle Theft The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle.
Source: FBI (2004).
monthly reports from approximately 17,000 local, county, city, university, state, and
tribal law enforcement agencies. Although participation is voluntary and has increased
over time, in 2010 the UCR data covered law enforcement agencies representing 97.4
percent of the U.S. population (FBI, 2011b). The data submitted by each agency each
month include the number of reported offenses of murder, manslaughter, rape, aggra-
vated assault, simple assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft. Table 2.1
summarizes the definitions of each offense. In cases when a crime falls into more than
one category, the FBI uses a “heirarchy rule” to assign the crime to the most serious
offense category (FBI, 2004).
A central challenge in using the agency-level UCR data to construct monthly county-
level crime rate time series is that the number of reported crimes in the data increases
dramatically through the 1960s and 1970s, due both to changes in the number of agen-
cies reporting and to more comprehensive reporting by individual agencies. Because
of these limitations, developing a county-level time series that is consistent across years
would involve considerable researcher judgment about non-reporting bias (and would
most likely require excluding a large number of observations from the analysis). Al-
though previous research on criminal behavior has made use of such annual UCR data
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(e.g., Levitt, 1996), in this chapter I take a different approach in which I construct a time
series that is consistent only across months within each county-by-year group of ob-
servations. To build this time series, I first drop any agency-by-year records in which
an agency reported less than twelve months of data for that year.13 I then sum the total
number of reported crimes by all remaining agencies in each county, by category of
crime, to generate a county total for each month and year. Finally, using county pop-
ulation data from the U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 1978, 2004, 2011), I calculate
the monthly crime rate per 100,000 persons, for each county-by-month observation.
As I discuss below in the Methodology section, the fact that the number of reporting
agencies differs across years within each county does not affect my regressions results,
since I identify the effect of weather on crime using only variation in month-to-month
weather and crime within a particular county and year (for which the set of reporting
agencies is identical).
The second major component of my dataset is daily weather data taken from the
U.S. National Climatic Data Center’s (NCDC) Global Historical Climatology Network
Daily data. The GHCN-Daily dataset is a compilation of weather station records
drawn from a variety of sources, and includes about 75,000 weather stations world-
wide (NCDC Climate Service Branch, 2011). The weather variables that I extract from
the the dataset are daily maximum temperature and daily precipitation. Unlike some
other sources of weather data (e.g., the NCDC’s Global Summary of the Day), the
GHCN-Daily data are subjected a set of quality assurance reviews that include check-
ing for weather data that are duplicated, weather data that exceed physical or clima-
tological limits, consecutive datapoints that show excessive persistence or gaps, and
data with inconsistencies internally or across neighboring stations.
Because the GHCN-Daily data report weather at a set of weather stations that are
spaced irregularly across the United States, I use the station data to generate county
13I also drop agency-by-year records in which the agency reported data on a quarterly, bi-yearly, or
yearly basis, rather than monthly. Most of these cases are agencies located in Florida or Alabama.
73
weather as follows. First, I create a set of grid points covering the entire United States,
spaced approximately 5 miles apart. I then calculate the distance from each grid point
to each weather station. Next, I estimate a county-level temperature signal using all
stations within 50 miles of any grid point within a county. Finally, I adjust the abso-
lute value of this signal so that it is equal to the average temperature reported at the
stations closest to each county gridpoint. I calculate county-level precipitation using a
similar procedure.
After combining the county-level crime and weather data, I take several final steps to
clean the crime data. First, I drop all county-by-year records in which U.S. Census es-
timates indicate that the county had a population of fewer than 1,000 persons. Second,
I drop all county-by-year records in which zero crimes were reported in all months, or
in which weather data are missing for at least one month. Third, I eliminate outliers
(almost all of which appear to be reporting errors) by dropping county-by-year obser-
vations in which the crime rate in any month is greater than twice the value of the 99th
percentile crime rate for the entire sample. Finally, to minimize problems with het-
eroskedasticity in the data, I drop counties in which the mean crime rate is above the
99th percentile or below the 1st percentile for the entire sample. The resulting dataset
includes 2,972 in-sample counties (out of the universe of 3,143 counties), with a total of
1.46 million unique county-by-year-by-month observations.
2.3.2 Summary Statistics
This section of the chapter presents summary statistics on crime and weather patterns
in the United States. To illustrate how these patterns vary geographically, I divide the
United States into four climate zones and then assign each county to a climate zone
based on its long-term mean annnual maximum daily temperature. The zones are <55
degrees F, 55 to 64 degrees F, 65 to 74 degrees F, and ≥75 degrees F. Panel (a) of Figure
2.1 shows a map of the climate zones. As expected, northern areas of the United States
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are more likely to have cooler climates. For comparison, Panel (b) of the figure shows
a map of county-level annual crime rates per 100,000 persons, for all crimes. The panel
shows that crime rates are highest along the Eastern Seaboard, in the West, and in areas
bordering the Great Lakes. However, there is no obvious cross-sectional relationship
between the temperature zones and crime rates.14
Table 2.2 summarizes basic characteristics of the crime and weather datasets, by cli-
mate zone. The first panel presents mean annual crime rates per 100,000 persons,
by type of offense. The panel shows that some categories of crime, such as murder,
manslaughter, rape, and robbery, are relatively uncommon. The three categories with
the highest rates are larceny, burglary, and simple assault.
The second panel in Table 2.2 describes the annual distribution of daily temperatures
and precipitation for in-sample counties. Unlike crime rates, these data show sub-
stantial variation across climate zones. For example, although counties in the coolest
climate zone (<55 degrees F) have an average of only five days per year in which the
maximum temperature exceeds 90 degrees F, counties in the warmest climate zone
(≥75 degrees F) typically have 85 days per year with temperatures above 90 degrees F.
The final panel in Table 2.2 describes county socioeconomic characteristics. The panel
shows that counties in cooler climate zones have fewer minorities and are more likely
to be rural.
To illustrate the advantages and challenges of using the UCR crime reporting data, Fig-
ure 2.2 presents the time trend in crime rates for the nine major categories of offenses,
by climate zone. Several main patterns are obvious from the data. First, crime rates
increase dramatically between 1960 and 1980, in some cases by several hundred per-
cent. Given the rapid and monotonic nature of the this increase, it seems likely that it
14Given the many socioeconomic variables that influence crime, the absence of a strong visual cross-
sectional relationship between temperatures and crime does not necessarily indicate the lack of a causal
relationship. A cross-sectional analysis in the spirit of Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994) would
have to control for other first-order determinants of crime (e.g., population density).
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(a) Mean Annual Maximum Daily Temperature (F)
(b) Annual Crime Rate per 100,000 Persons (All Crimes)
Figure 2.1: Map of the Study Region
Note: Both panels show maps of all in-sample counties in the United States. The top panel depicts the
mean annual maximum daily temperature, by county. The bottom panel depicts the annual number of
all crimes per 100,000 persons, by county. All statistics are based on data from 1960-2009.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics, by Climate Zone
Mean Annual Maximum Daily Temperature
<55 F 55-64 F 65-74 F ≥75 F
Monthly Crime Rate (per 100,000 persons)
Murder 0.1 (1.2) 0.2 (1.3) 0.4 (1.9) 0.6 (2.2)
Manslaughter 0.03 (0.53) 0.03 (0.50) 0.02 (0.45) 0.02 (0.42)
Rape 1.2 (3.5) 1.2 (3.2) 1.3 (3.3) 1.6 (3.5)
Aggravated Assault 6 (13) 9 (14) 15 (20) 20 (22)
Simple Assault 26 (40) 31 (39) 34 (48) 41 (52)
Robbery 1 (3) 2 (5) 3 (6) 4 (8)
Burglary 43 (48) 44 (45) 50 (46) 61 (53)
Larceny 111 (94) 117 (98) 107 (97) 125 (112)
Vehicle Theft 9 (12) 11 (15) 11 (15) 13 (18)
Annual Number of Days in Weather Bin
Max Temp: <10 F 13 (11) 3 (4) 0 (1) 0 (0)
Max Temp: 10-19 F 20 (8) 7 (6) 1 (2) 0 (0)
Max Temp: 20-29 F 37 (9) 20 (11) 5 (5) 0 (1)
Max Temp: 30-39 F 52 (12) 44 (14) 18 (11) 3 (4)
Max Temp: 40-49 F 41 (11) 49 (14) 35 (12) 12 (8)
Max Temp: 50-59 F 40 (9) 49 (16) 50 (11) 31 (13)
Max Temp: 60-69 F 49 (11) 52 (13) 59 (13) 54 (13)
Max Temp: 70-79 F 64 (11) 64 (14) 68 (14) 77 (14)
Max Temp: 80-89 F 43 (14) 63 (18) 86 (18) 101 (28)
Max Temp: ≥90 F 6 (8) 15 (14) 43 (25) 86 (29)
Precip: 0 mm 179 (47) 165 (44) 196 (40) 215 (46)
Precip: 1-4 mm 143 (37) 149 (34) 111 (29) 95 (30)
Precip: 5-14 mm 32 (11) 37 (14) 36 (12) 33 (14)
Precip: 15-29 mm 9 (4) 11 (6) 15 (7) 15 (7)
Precip: ≥30 mm 2 (2) 3 (3) 6 (4) 8 (5)
County Characteristics
Population 36,289 (51,843) 96,286 (246,799) 71,616 (316,927) 86,742 (237,757)
Pct White 97 (8) 96 (6) 87 (16) 78 (18)
Pct Female 50 (1) 51 (1) 51 (2) 51 (2)
Pct Ages 0-4 7 (2) 7 (1) 7 (1) 8 (1)
Pct Ages 5-19 25 (5) 25 (4) 25 (4) 26 (5)
Pct Ages 65-up 15 (4) 14 (4) 13 (4) 13 (5)
Pct Metro Center 2 (15) 7 (26) 6 (24) 4 (20)
Pct Metropolitan 14 (35) 24 (43) 22 (41) 27 (44)
Pct Urban 54 (50) 50 (50) 50 (50) 56 (50)
Pct Rural 30 (46) 19 (40) 22 (41) 13 (33)
Counties 209 1,092 1,141 530
Complete County Years 9,183 48,288 45,544 18,954
County Month Obs. 110,196 579,456 546,528 227,448
Note: The table shows mean crime rates, weather conditions, and socioeconomic characteristics
for all in-sample counties for the years 1960-2009. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard
deviations. Results are presented separately for counties in each of four climate zones, based on
mean annual maximum daily temperature.
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is driven by increased reporting of crimes, rather than by changes in underlying crim-
inal behavior. Second, trends across climate zones appear broadly similar, although
there is some heterogeneity in absolute levels. Finally, there is strong evidence of high
frequency variation in crime rates due to seasonality.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present additional evidence on seasonality in the data. Figure 2.3
shows the mean value of daily maximum temperature and daily precipitation, by cli-
mate zone and month. The figure shows strong seasonal patterns in all climate zones,
for all variables. Seasonal variation is largest in the coolest climate zone (<55 degrees
F), where the mean temperature difference between January and July is 60 degrees.
For comparison, the seasonal temperature difference between January and July in the
warmest climate zone (≥75 degrees F) is about 35 degrees.
Figure 2.4 presents similar graphs illustrating how crime rates vary by climate zone
and month. The figure shows that all categories of crime show evidence of season-
ality, although the degree of seasonal variation varies widely across crimes. A few
categories of crime, particularly murder and robbery, show only modest seasonal vari-
ation. Other categories, such as rape, assault, and non-violent property crimes, exhibit
strong seasonality. Additionally, the relationship between seasonality and crime rates
variety across climate zones and type of crimes. For example, larceny and burglary
show more pronounced seasonal variation in cooler climate zones, whereas robbery
shows somewhat more seasonality in warmer climates.
2.4 Methodology
The summary statistics from the previous section show a strong correlation between
monthly weather and crime rates. In this section I develop a causal econometric model
of this relationship. Specifically, I model crime in month m of year y in county i as
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(a) Murder (b) Manslaughter (c) Rape
(d) Aggravated Assault (e) Simple Assault (f) Robbery
(g) Burglary (h) Larceny (i) Vehicle Theft
Figure 2.2: Crime Rate Trends, by Climate Zone
Note: Each panel shows the mean crime rate across counties within each climate zone, by year and
month. The crime rate variables represent the monthly number of crimes per 100,000 persons.
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(a) Maximum Daily Temperature (F) (b) Daily Precipitation (mm)
Figure 2.3: Seasonal Weather Patterns, by Climate Zone
Note: Each panel shows mean weather across counties within each climate zone, by month, for the
period from 1960 to 2009.
follows:
Ciym =
10∑
j=1
αj0T
j
iym +
5∑
k=1
βk0P
k
iym
+
10∑
j=1
αj1T
j
iym−1 +
5∑
k=1
βk1P
k
iym−1
+ φim + θiy + iym (2.1)
In this equation, Ciym represents the monthly crime rate per 100,000 residents, φim is
a county-by-month fixed effect, θiy is a county-by-year fixed effect, and iym is a zero-
mean error term. Following Deschenes and Greenstone (2011), I model the daily dis-
tribution of temperatures within a month using ten bin variables: <10 F, 10-19 F, 20-29
F, 30-39 F, 40-49 F, 50-59 F, 60-69 F, 70-79 F, 80-89 F, and ≥90 F. For example, the vari-
able T jiym represents the number of days in month m of year y in county c in which
the temperature fell into temperature bin j. I use a similar convention for the precip-
itation variables P kiym, with five bins: 0 mm, 1-4 mm, 5-14 mm, 15-29 mm, and ≥30
mm. Because of the possibility that changes in crime rates due to weather shocks may
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(a) Murder (b) Manslaughter (c) Rape
(d) Aggravated Assault (e) Simple Assault (f) Robbery
(g) Burglary (h) Larceny (i) Vehicle Theft
Figure 2.4: Seasonal Crime Rate Trends, by Climate Zone
Note: Each panel shows the mean crime rate across counties within each climate zone, by month. The
crime rate variables represent the monthly number of crimes per 100,000 persons.
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exhibit negative serial correlation (Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti, 2007), I also include a
one month lag of each temperature and precipitation bin variable. Furthermore, be-
cause weather patterns in a particular month are highly correlated between adjacent
geographic areas, I cluster all standard errors at the year-by-month level. I also weight
each county-by-month-by-year observation by the county population in that year.
Equation (2.1) includes several features designed to address issues that have been prob-
lematic in previous analysis of the effect of weather on criminal behavior. First, by us-
ing a semi-parametric specification for weather, I avoid imposing structural assump-
tions on the relationship between weather and crime. Previous analyses have used
as independent variables mean weekly temperature and precipitation (Jacob, Lefgren,
and Moretti, 2007) or mean yearly temperature and temperature squared (Rotton and
Cohn, 2003). These specifications assume that weather has a linear or quadratic effect
on crime—which, as the results from this chapter show, may fail to capture important
features of the relationship.
Second, Equation (2.1) includes an extrordinarily comprehensive set of fixed effects. In
addition to including dummy variables for typical monthly patterns in weather and
crime with each county, I include dummy variables that capture the average crime rate
and weather conditions in each county-by-year set of observations. In other words,
my identification strategy is based on only the residual variation in crime and weather
remaining between months within a particular county and year, after controlling for
average monthly crime levels.
The motivation for this extensive set of fixed effects is related to the quality of the FBI’s
crime data. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the UCR crime data exhibit strong interannual
trends that appear to be driven at least partially by differences in reporting. Examina-
tion of the microdata shows that at the level of individual counties, these trends are
exacerbated, with crime rates in many counties jumping wildly from year to year as
the set of reporting agencies changes over time. In the two previous national stud-
82
ies of crime and climate change (Anderson, Bushman, and Groom, 1997; Rotton and
Cohn, 2003), the authors addressed this problem by modeling annual changes in aggre-
gate national or state crime rates as an autoregressive process. Because this approach
is not an entirely satisfactory method for dealing with measurement error in the de-
pendent variable, I choose an alternative methodology that requires no consistency in
reporting between years. Instead, as discussed in the data section, I construct monthly
crime rates within each county-by-year by aggregating the total number of reported
crimes each month only for agencies that reported twelve complete months of data
for that year. Thus, although the set of reporting agencies within each county changes
between years, making interannual comparisons invalid except under very strong as-
sumptions, an identical set of agencies report for each month within a particular year.
Thus, the identifying assumption for my analysis is that after controlling for county-
by-year and county-by-month fixed effects, differences in weather and crime between
months within a county represent the true effect of weather on crime.
2.5 Results
This section presents the main results from the analysis.
2.5.1 Weather and Crime Rates
I begin by presenting the regression results from estimating Equation (2.1). Because of
the large number of coefficients, the results are easiest to understand using a graphical
approach. For example, Figure 2.5 plots the regression coefficients on the temperature
and lagged temperature bin variables. In each subfigure, the horizontal axis represents
the daily maximum temperature bins, and the vertical axis represents the coefficient,
with units of number of crimes per 100,000 persons per month. The figure shows that
across all types of crime, higher temperatures cause statistically significant increases in
crime rates. As an illustration, compared to a day in the 60-69 degrees F bin, an extra
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day in the 30-39 degrees F bin leads to 0.002 fewer murders, 0.08 fewer aggravated
assaults, and 1.1 fewer larcenies, per 100,000 persons per month. In comparison, the
mean monthly crime rates for these three offenses are .35 cases of murder, 14 cases of
aggravated assult, and 114 cases of larceny. Although the estimated coefficients appear
small relative to mean crime rates, the coefficients represent the effect of only a single
day of weather per month, and in aggregate imply substantial effects. For example, in
a spring month with 10 unusually cold days (in the 30-39 degrees F bin), crime rates
for these three offenses would be approximately seven to ten percent lower than crime
rates in a spring month with 10 unusually warm days (in the 60-69 degrees F bin).
Figure 2.5 also shows the significant non-linearities in the effect of temperatures on
crime. These non-linear effects are most apparent for property crimes such as burglary
and larceny. For bins below 40 degrees F, increases in temperature have a strong pos-
itive effect on the number of burglaries and larcenies reported. However, above 40
degrees F, increases in temperature have little or no effect on these crimes. The degree
of nonlinearity varies by offense, with violent crimes tending to have a much more
linear relationship through the entire range of temperatures.
In addition to showing the effect of current monthly temperatures on current monthly
crime, Figure 2.5 also presents coefficients and confidence intervals for the effect of
lagged temperature from the previous month. For most offenses, the coefficients on
lagged temperatures are close to zero and not statistically significant. Thus, unlike
Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti (2007), who find a significant and opposite coefficient on
lagged weekly temperatures that dampens the effect of weather on weekly crime, I
conclude that at the monthly level, there is little evidence that weather has a lagged
effect on crime patterns.
Table 2.3 presents complete regression results from estimating Equation (2.1), includ-
ing the results for the precipitation bin variables. The table shows that the effects of
precipition on crime rates vary by offense. Although precipitation causes statistically
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(a) Murder (b) Manslaughter (c) Rape
(d) Aggravated Assault (e) Simple Assault (f) Robbery
(g) Burglary (h) Larceny (i) Vehicle Theft
Figure 2.5: The Effect of Daily Maximum Temperature on Monthly Crime
Note: Each figure shows coefficients from a regression of the monthly crime rate per 100,000 persons on a
semiparametric set of weather bin variables. The solid black line represent the effect of current weather;
the solid gray line represents the lagged effect of the previous month’s weather. Dashed lines represent
95 percent confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients. All coefficients are relative to one day in
the 60 to 70 degrees F bin.
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significant decreases in larceny, the opposite is true for vehicle theft: more vehicles are
stolen in months with many rainy days.
One key question about the analytical approach used in this chapter is whether one
month is a sufficiently long time period to account for any lagged impacts of weather
on crime. Although the mostly insignificant coefficients on the one-month lag of the
weather bins suggest that this is the case, I also conduct sensitivity analyses in which
I run regressions using data that have been aggregated to quarterly and half-year time
periods. Figure 2.12 in the Appendix shows the results of this analysis. Although
regressions results based on more aggregate time periods are noisier than the results
based on month-long time periods, the estimated coefficients from the three types of
regressions are generally similar. For example, although the relationship between tem-
perature and crime rates for aggravated and simple assault appears somewhat weaker
based on the quarterly and half-year data, the effect of temperature on burglary and
larceny is even stronger in the quarterly and half-year data. Overall, the figure sug-
gests that a one-month aggregation period is sufficient to account for “harvesting” that
might occur as a result of negative serial correlation in crime rates.
In addition to the main specifications presented in Figure 2.5 and Table 2.3, I have run a
variety of other sensitivity analyses in which I allow the coefficients on the weather bin
variables to vary by climate zone, monthly mean temperature, and decade. The results
from these analyses are qualitatively similar to the main specification presented here,
and are presented in the appendix.
2.5.2 Climate Change and Crime Rates
To assess how climate change is likely to affect crime rates in the United States, I
combine the regression estimates from the previous section with data on simulated
U.S. weather conditions for the time period from 2010 to 2099. These simulations are
based on the IPCC’s A1B scenario, a “middle-of-the-road” climate change scenario
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Table 2.3: Maximum Daily Temperature and Monthly Crime
Murder Mansltr Rape Agg Asslt Smp Asslt Robbery Burglary Larceny Veh Theft
Temp: < 10 F -0.003*** -0.001** -0.028*** -0.128*** -0.245*** -0.040*** -0.872*** -2.945*** -0.258***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.019) (0.061) (0.012) (0.057) (0.169) (0.025)
Temp: 10-19 F -0.002** -0.000 -0.026*** -0.059** -0.250*** -0.051*** -0.843*** -2.597*** -0.308***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.021) (0.043) (0.011) (0.054) (0.145) (0.026)
Temp: 20-29 F -0.002*** -0.000 -0.017*** -0.128*** -0.136*** -0.034*** -0.604*** -1.828*** -0.217***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.031) (0.009) (0.040) (0.094) (0.020)
Temp: 30-39 F -0.002*** -0.001** -0.016*** -0.078*** -0.168*** -0.011 -0.267*** -1.081*** -0.157***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.024) (0.008) (0.034) (0.064) (0.016)
Temp: 40-49 F -0.001** 0.000 -0.010*** -0.035*** -0.055** 0.021** 0.039 -0.385*** -0.060***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.021) (0.007) (0.031) (0.059) (0.013)
Temp: 50-59 F -0.001** -0.000 -0.005*** -0.024** -0.023 0.002 0.021 -0.108* -0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.016) (0.006) (0.025) (0.050) (0.016)
Temp: 70-79 F 0.000 0.000 0.008*** 0.091*** 0.160*** 0.009 0.006 -0.025 -0.020
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.018) (0.006) (0.030) (0.058) (0.015)
Temp: 80-89 F 0.002** -0.000 0.012*** 0.113*** 0.224*** 0.017* 0.072 -0.019 -0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.012) (0.031) (0.008) (0.044) (0.096) (0.018)
Temp: ≥90 F 0.002** 0.000 0.018*** 0.175*** 0.310*** 0.026* 0.100 -0.121 0.045
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.018) (0.042) (0.011) (0.064) (0.129) (0.024)
Precip: 1-4 mm 0.001** 0.000 0.002** 0.011* -0.005 0.002 0.013 0.041 0.052***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.013) (0.004) (0.020) (0.046) (0.009)
Precip: 5-14 mm 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.020* -0.010 -0.004 -0.040 -0.405*** 0.026
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007) (0.037) (0.086) (0.019)
Precip: 15-29 mm 0.002* 0.001* -0.001 -0.004 0.016 0.009 -0.059 -0.413*** 0.136***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.032) (0.010) (0.043) (0.103) (0.027)
Precip: ≥30 mm -0.001 -0.000 -0.005 -0.070** -0.029 0.046** 0.119 -0.920*** 0.136**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.022) (0.041) (0.015) (0.067) (0.163) (0.047)
Lag T: < 10 F 0.001 0.001** -0.002 0.008 -0.012 0.020 -0.001 -0.377** 0.046
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.020) (0.042) (0.012) (0.047) (0.119) (0.028)
Lag T: 10-19 F 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.010 -0.052 0.010 -0.131** -0.037 -0.047
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.028) (0.061) (0.014) (0.050) (0.135) (0.025)
Lag T: 20-29 F -0.001** 0.002*** 0.003 0.013 0.037 -0.035*** -0.214*** -0.209* 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.030) (0.009) (0.039) (0.092) (0.018)
Lag T: 30-39 F 0.000 0.000** 0.001 0.033*** 0.026 0.001 -0.034 -0.289*** -0.012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.024) (0.007) (0.032) (0.076) (0.014)
Lag T: 40-49 F 0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.004 -0.027 -0.010 -0.046 -0.126 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.022) (0.006) (0.029) (0.068) (0.014)
Lag T: 50-59 F -0.000 0.000 0.003** 0.023** -0.049*** -0.018** -0.097*** -0.086 0.021
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.023) (0.047) (0.013)
Lag T: 70-79 F 0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.028*** 0.018 -0.020*** -0.079* -0.086 -0.025
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.019) (0.006) (0.031) (0.063) (0.016)
Lag T: 80-89 F 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.043 -0.006 -0.044 -0.074 -0.014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.012) (0.031) (0.008) (0.041) (0.103) (0.018)
Lag T: ≥90 F 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.005 -0.057 0.003 0.031 -0.051 0.022
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.017) (0.042) (0.010) (0.057) (0.127) (0.024)
Lag P: 1-4 mm 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000 0.011 0.019 0.022*** 0.051* -0.012 0.028**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.014) (0.004) (0.021) (0.050) (0.010)
Lag P: 5-14 mm -0.000 -0.000* -0.001 0.047*** 0.062** -0.003 -0.062 0.017 0.031
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.009) (0.022) (0.007) (0.033) (0.078) (0.016)
Lag P: 15-29 mm -0.001 -0.000 0.007*** 0.024 0.082* 0.008 0.021 -0.034 0.048
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.032) (0.011) (0.047) (0.108) (0.025)
Lag P: ≥30 mm 0.004** 0.000 0.006 0.084*** 0.168*** -0.004 -0.023 -0.269 0.055
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.019) (0.044) (0.017) (0.068) (0.141) (0.042)
Observations 1,315,325 848,837 1,315,325 1,237,676 1,237,676 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325
Clusters 539 341 539 506 506 539 539 539 539
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.022 0.053 0.011
Note: Each observation represents a unique county-by-year-by-month. The dependent variable in all regressions is the monthly
crime rate per 100,000 persons, with each column representing a different type of crime. The independent variables are the number
of days per month that daily weather fell into the specified range, with 60-69 F as the omitted temperature bin and 0 mm as the
omitted precipitation bin. All regressions control for county-by-year and county-by-month fixed effects. The county-by-year fixed
effects are removed by long differencing relatative to January of each county-by-year group of twelve months, and the dropping
all (zeroed-out) January observations. County-by-month fixed effects are removed by de-meaning. All regressions are clustered
by year-by-month, and weighted by county population.
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that assumes eventual stabilization of atmospheric CO2 levels at 720 ppm (IPCC, 2000,
2007). I use predictions from two general circulation models: the U.K. Hadley Cen-
tre’s HadCM3 climate model, and the U.S. National Center for Atmospheric Research’s
CCSM3 climate model. The predictions, which are available from an archive main-
tained by the World Climate Research Programme’s Coupled Model Intercomparison
Project Phase 3 (CMIP3), have an interpolated resolution of two degrees of latitude by
two degrees of longitude (WCRP, 2007; Maurer et al, 2007).
To use these data to estimate how climate change is likely to affect crime rates in each
county in my analysis, I follow several steps. First, I use the HadCM3 and CCSM3 pro-
jections to calculate average predicted monthly temperature and precipitation for each
decade between 2000 and 2099, for each two degree-by-two degree gridpoint. Taking
the average monthly values for 2000-2009 as a baseline, I then calculate the absolute
change in mean monthly temperature and the proportional change in mean monthly
precipitation at each gridpoint for each subsequent decade, relative to 2000-2009. I then
assign each U.S. county a predicted change in temperature and precipitation for each
future decade and month, based on the changes predicted at the closest HadCM3 and
CCSM3 gridpoint.
Next, I use these predicted changes to generate a simulated distribution of days across
temperature and precipitation bins for each of the nine decades starting with 2010-2019
and ending with 2090-2099, for each month and county. I begin with the actual record
of temperatures for each day, month, and county between 2000 and 2009. For each
decade, I then add the predicted absolute change in monthly temperature to each daily
temperature, by month and county, yielding a new predicted record of daily temper-
atures. I generate simulated precipitation data by multiplying the daily precipitation
values by the proportional change in predicted precipitation. I then use these counter-
factual weather records to calculate the mean number of days that will fall into each
temperature and precipitation bin in each county and month, in each future decade. I
conduct this procedure separately for the HadCM3 and CCSM3 predictions.
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Finally, to predict how the projected change in weather will affect crime rates in each
county, month, and decade, I combine the climate projections with the regression co-
efficients estimated in the previous section. I estimate the change in crime rates ∆Cidm
in county i, decade d, and month m using the following formula:
∆Cidm = 10 ·
[ 10∑
j=1
αj0(T¯
j
i,d,m − T¯ ji,2000,m) +
5∑
k=1
βk0 (P¯
k
i,d,m − P¯ ki,2000,m)
+
10∑
j=1
αj1(T¯
j
i,d,m−1 − T¯ ji,2000,m−1) +
5∑
k=1
βk1 (P¯
k
i,d,m−1 − P¯ ki,2000,m−1)
]
(2.2)
where T¯ ji,d,m refers to the mean number of days per month in which the simulated tem-
perature in month m in county c in decade fell into temperature bin j. The predicted
precipitation variable P¯ ki,d,m−1 is defined similarly. The variables T¯
j
i,2000,m and P¯
k
i,2000,m−1
refer to the actual distribution of days across temperature and precipitation bins dur-
ing the decade from 2000 to 2009. I multiply the entire expression on the right-hand
side of the equation by ten to account for the number of years in each decade.15
Before discussing the results of this analysis, I present information on the changes in
weather predicted by the CCSM3 and HadCM3 models. Figure 2.6 shows the distribu-
tion of temperature and precipitation across bins for three scenarios: the actual weather
patterns observed between 2000 and 2009, the weather patterns predicted for 2090 to
2099 by the CCSM3 model, and the weather patterns predicted for 2090 to 2099 by the
HadCM3 model. The figure shows that the baseline (2000-2009) maximum daily tem-
perature distribution is heavily left-skewed. As a result, the increases in temperatures
predicted by the CCSM3 and HadCM3 models lead to a sharp increase in the number
of days that are predicted to fall into the highest daily maximum temperature bin (≥90
degrees F). The number of days in all other bins decreases under both sets of model
predictions.
Table 2.4 shows the predicted impacts of climate change on crime in the United States.
The first two columns of the table present estimates of the additional number of crimes
15Note that I also adjust ∆Cidm to account for the actual county population.
89
(a) Maximum Daily Temperature (F) (b) Daily Precipitation (mm)
Figure 2.6: Distribution of Daily Weather, by Scenario
Note: Each panel shows the number of days per month that fall into the specified weather bin.
that will occur between 2010 and 2099, compared to the number that would have
occurred in the absence of climate change. The table shows that under both climate
models, climate change will cause a strikingly large number of crimes during the next
century. For example, under the HadCM3 model, there will be an additional 35,000
murders, 216,000 cases of rape, 1.6 million aggravated assaults, 2.4 million simple as-
saults, 409,000 robberies, 3.1 million burglaries, 3.8 million cases of larceny, and 1.4
million cases of vehicle theft. All of these changes are significant at the five percent
threshold. The only category of crime that is expected to decrease is manslaughter,
but the expected change is less than 1,000 crimes and is not significantly different from
zero. Compared to the baseline number of crimes expected to occur during this 90 year
period in the absence of climate change, these figures represent a 3.6% increase in mur-
der, a 2.7% decrease in manslaughter, a 3.8% increase in cases of rape, a 3.1% increase
in aggravated assault, a 1.3% increase in simple assault, a 1.6% increase in robbery, a
2.3% increase in burglary, a 0.9% increase in cases of larceny, and a 1.9% increase in
cases of vehicle theft.
Because these offenses occur over a 90 year time period and include a variety of types
of crimes, it is useful to aggregate them into a social cost metric. I estimate the social
costs of future changes in crime using the following valuations per offense: $5,000,000
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Table 2.4: The Predicted Impact of Climate Change on Crime
Number of Social Cost (billions)
Additional Crimes HadCM3 CCSM3
Crime HadCM3 CCSM3 3% 6% 3% 6%
Murder 34,853 25,290 42.6 17.4 30.8 11.9
(7,890) (5,091) (9.4) (3.7) (6.1) (2.3)
Manslaughter -1,066 -1,590 -1.5 -0.6 -2.2 -1.0
(2,057) (1,470) (2.5) (1.0) (1.8) (0.7)
Rape 216,258 160,488 2.2 0.9 1.6 0.6
(29,160) (19,034) (0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
Aggravated Assault 1,582,743 1,154,021 7.5 3.0 5.5 2.1
(203,959) (134,190) (1.0) (0.4) (0.6) (0.3)
Simple Assault 2,428,195 1,862,546 2.9 1.2 2.2 0.9
(549,913) (370,464) (0.7) (0.3) (0.5) (0.2)
Robbery 409,323 295,152 2.2 0.9 1.6 0.6
(132,519) (90,996) (0.7) (0.3) (0.5) (0.2)
Burglary 3,079,435 2,563,501 4.8 2.0 4.1 1.7
(712,709) (481,084) (1.1) (0.4) (0.7) (0.3)
Larceny 3,806,456 4,180,251 3.5 1.5 3.9 1.7
(1,511,895) (1,037,660) (1.3) (0.6) (0.9) (0.5)
Vehicle Theft 1,427,532 1,099,411 3.6 1.4 3.0 1.2
(259,308) (180,888) (0.6) (0.3) (0.5) (0.2)
Total 67.8 27.7 50.5 19.7
Note: The “Number of Additional Crimes” columns represent the number of
additional crimes that will occur due to climate change, relative to the num-
ber that would occur if temperatures and precipitation stayed at the 2000-
2009 averages. The “HadCM3” and “CCSM3” columns show results based
on different climate models. The “Social Cost” columns present the present
value of the social cost of the additional crimes that will occur due to climate
change. Future costs are discounted using two alternative discount rates: 3%
and 6%.
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for murder and manslaughter, $41,247 for rape, $19,537 for aggravated assault, $4,884
for simple assault, $21,398 for robbery, $6,170 for burglary, $3,523 for larceny, and
$10,534 for motor vehicle theft. The social cost estimates for murder and manslaugh-
ter are based on the value of a statistical life (VSL) for workers in U.S. labor markets.
Estimates of VSL typically range between $4 million and $9 million (Viscusi and Aldy,
2003), and I choose $5 million as a plausible value. Estimates of the social cost of the
remaining offences are drawn from a review article by McCollister, French, and Fang
(2010). These valuations represent the tangible costs of crime, including medical ex-
penses, cash losses, property theft or damage, lost earnings because of injury, other
victimization-related consequences, criminal justice system costs, and career crime
costs.16 Although McCollister, French, and Fang also report intangible costs of crime
(such as pain and suffering), I exclude these estimates because they are based on jury
awards that may not accurately reflect individuals’ actual willingness to pay to avoid
victimization. Exclusion of this category of costs may bias my estimates of the social
cost downward.
The right-hand side of Table 2.4 shows estimates of the social cost of the climate-related
crime that is likely to occur between 2010 and 2099. Including all offenses, the social
costs of this crime are between $20 billion and $68 billion. Because of the high value
of a statistical life, the costs of future murders are by far the largest component of
total social cost. As the table demonstrates, the estimates are somewhat sensitive to
the choice of climate model and discount rate. For example, based on the HadCM3
model and a three percent discount rate, the present discounted cost of climate-related
murder over the next ninety years is $42 billion. Based on the CCSM3 model and a six
percent discount rate, the social cost of murder is only $12 billion.
One fact that is not apparent from Table 2.4 is that the impacts of climate change on
crime are not uniformly distributed across the United States. To investigate distribu-
16McCollister, French, and Fang (2010) do not report estimates of the social cost of simple assault. For
the purposes of this analysis, I value each case of simple assault at 25 percent of the cost of a case of
aggravated assault.
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Figure 2.7: Present Discounted Social Cost of Climate-Related Crime, Per Person
Note: The map shows the per capita present discounted value of the social costs of the additional crimes
estimated to be caused by climate change between 2010 and 2099. Costs are presented per person, for
each county. The costs are based on climate predictions from the HadCM3 model, and are discounted
using a discount rate of 6 percent.
tional effects, Figure 2.7 presents—for each U.S. county—the per capita present dis-
counted value of the total social costs of future climate-related crime, by county. In
other words, the figure shows the discounted value of the social cost of the number
of additional crimes expect to occur in each county over the next 90 years, divided by
each county’s current population. The table shows that the per capita cost of climate-
related crime is highest in the West, where costs are between $140 and $180 per person,
and lowest in the South and East, where costs are less than $80 per person.
2.6 Discussion
The previous sections highlight two main results. First, weather has a strong causal ef-
fect on the incidence of criminal activity. For all offenses except manslaughter, higher
temperatures lead to higher crime rates. The functional form of the relationship varies
across offenses, with some categories, particularly property crimes, showing largest
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marginal effects below 40 degrees F. This low-temperature dependency is in some
ways surprising. Analyses of the impact of climate change on other economic out-
comes, such as agriculture, have highlighted the role of extremely warm temperatures
(Schlenker and Roberts, 2009). In contrast, my results suggest that the impact of cli-
mate change on property crime may operate largely through changes in the frequency
of days with low to moderate temperatures.
Second, climate change will cause a substantial increase in crime in the United States.
Relative to the total number of offenses that would occur between 2010 and 2099 in
the absence of climate change, my calculations suggest that there will be an additional
35,000 murders, 216,000 cases of rape, 1.6 million aggravated assaults, 2.4 million sim-
ple assaults, 409,000 robberies, 3.1 million burglaries, 3.8 million cases of larceny, and
1.4 million cases of vehicle theft. The present discounted value of the social costs of
these climate-related crimes is between 20 and 68 billion dollars.17
In interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that climate change will
affect humans in a variety of ways (Tol, 2009; Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007, 2011;
Hsiang, Meng, and Cane, 2011), and that a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of cli-
mate change should consider all dimensions of costs and benefits. For example, given
U.S. residents’ high willingness to pay to live in areas with moderate climates (Cragg
and Kahn, 1996), it is possible that the social costs of increased crime will be offset, at
least in some regions, by the social benefits of more pleasant weather.
It is also worth emphasizing that the estimates presented here do not take into ac-
count longer-term adaptation mechanisms. If climate change does cause a permanent
17To put these dollar values in context, Deschenes and Greenstone (2011) estimate that climate-related
changes in mortality and energy consumption will cause welfare losses of $892 billion over the next
century, based on a 3% discount rate and the HadCM3 model’s predictions for the A1F1 scenario. Dif-
ferencing out my estimate of the mortality-related costs of crime (murder and manslaughter together
have a cost of approximately $41 billion) implies that crime-related costs ($68 billion) are likely to be
about eight percent as large as the energy consumption and non-crime-related mortality costs of climate
change in the United States ($851). Of course, this comparison ignores any differences between the A1F1
and A1B emissions scenarios (the A1F1 scenario assumes higher emissions and more warming than the
A1B scenario used in this paper).
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increase in the frequency of crime, people in affected areas will have the opportunity
to modify their behavior to avoid being victimized. Furthermore, it is likely that law
enforcement agencies will respond with increased policing activity. The potential for
such actions suggests that the estimates in this chapter should be viewed as an upper
bound on the potential impacts of climate change on crime.
The estimates in this chapter also assume a static baseline of criminal activity, based on
average crime rates between 2000 and 2009. Given the challenges of accurately predict-
ing long-term trends in crime rates (Levitt, 2004), such an assumption is a reasonable
analytical strategy. However, if for reasons unrelated to climate change, crime rates
were to increase or decrease substantially over the coming decades, then the estimates
from this chapter could significantly over- or underestimate climate’s effects on future
crime.
As a final caveat, I emphasize that this chapter’s estimates of the social cost of climate-
related crime should be considered to be highly uncertain. Although I monetize the
social costs of additional crimes using point estimates drawn from the VSL and crime
literatures (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003; McCollister, French, and Fang, 2010), I make no at-
tempt to characterize the range of uncertainties associated with these valuations. Fur-
thermore, consistent with previous literature on the role of discounting in economic
analysis of climate change (Weitzman, 2007), I find that the present value of the social
costs of additional crime depends heavily on the choice of a discount rate. Thus, the
costs presented here are best interpreted as “back-of-the-envelope” estimates, rather
than as precise statements of the exact cost of climate-related crime.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I document a robust statistical relationship between historical weather
patterns and criminal activity, and use this relationship to predict how changes in U.S.
climate will affect future patterns of criminal behavior. The results suggest that climate
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change will have substantial effects on the prevalence of crime in the United States.
Although previous assessments of the costs and benefits of climate change have pri-
marily focused on other economic endpoints, the magnitude of the estimated impacts
from this chapter suggests that changes in crime are an important component of the
broader impacts of climate change.
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2.8 Appendix
This appendix presents the results of a variety of sensitivity analyses of the relationship
between weather and crime.
One potential concern about the analysis is that the relationship between weather and
crime may have changed over time. To address this concern, Figure 2.8 plots the co-
efficients from separate regressions based on each of the five decades covered by the
data: 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. The data show more
noise than the main regression results, but the overall pattern of crime increasing with
temperature remains similar across decades for almost all crimes.
A second potential question is related to long-term adaptation. In particular, if resi-
dents of warmer climates are better adapted to warmer temperatures, then the rela-
tionship between weather and crime may vary across geographic regions. To assess
whether this is the case, Figure 2.9 shows the results from separate regressions for
counties in each of the four climate zones (based on long-term mean annual maximum
daily temperature): <55 degrees F, 55 to 64 degrees F, 65 to 74 degrees F, and ≥75 de-
grees F. The figure shows that the effects of moderate and warm temperatures on crime
is strikingly similar across climate zones. For very cold temperatures, the coefficients
show somewhat more divergence, but this imprecision is primarily due to the fact that
there are few days in the dataset in which the warmest climate zones are exposed to
very low temperatures.
Another possibility related to adaptation is that people adjust to seasonal conditions, so
that crime rates are driven by weather conditions relative to local expectations for that
time of year. Under this hypothesis, a 60 degree F day could have very different effects
depending on whether it occured in April or July. As a test of this supposition, Figure
2.10 presents the results of a regression that includes interactions of the weather bin co-
efficients with three county-month temperature category variables. These categorical
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(a) Murder (b) Manslaughter (c) Rape
(d) Aggravated Assault (e) Simple Assault (f) Robbery
(g) Burglary (h) Larceny (i) Vehicle Theft
Figure 2.8: Monthly Crime and Daily Temperature, by Decade
Note: Each figure shows coefficients from regressions of the monthly crime rate per 100,000 persons
on a semiparametric set of weather bin variables, for separate sets of observations from five different
decades. These decades are: 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. All coefficients
are relative to one day in the 60 to 70 degrees F bin.
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(a) Murder (b) Manslaughter (c) Rape
(d) Aggravated Assault (e) Simple Assault (f) Robbery
(g) Burglary (h) Larceny (i) Vehicle Theft
Figure 2.9: Monthly Crime and Daily Temperature, by Climate Zone
Note: Each figure shows coefficients from regressions of the monthly crime rate per 100,000 persons
on a semiparametric set of weather bin variables, for counties in each of four climate zones. Each in-
sample county is assigned to a climate zone based on whether its long-term mean annual maximum
daily temperature falls into one of four ranges: <55 degrees F, 55 to 64 degrees F, 65 to 74 degrees F, and
≥75 degrees F. All coefficients are relative to one day in the 60 to 70 degrees F bin.
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dummy variables indicate whether the average temperature in each month-by-county,
over the period from 1960 to 2009, fell into one of three bins: <45 degrees F, 45 to 69
degrees F, or ≥70 F. Although the regressions show a fair amount of noise, particularly
for temperatures that are not typical of normal monthly conditions, there are no obvi-
ous differences in the effects of temperature on crime that can be attributed to seasonal
adaptation.
One additional concern about the analysis is related to heteroskedasticity in the crime
rate variables. There is a large degree of variation in absolute crime levels between
counties, and plots of time trends for individual counties show that the degree of sea-
sonal variation is roughly proportional to the magnitude of the crime rate. Unfortu-
nately, because the data contain a large number of months in which no crimes were
comitted (particularly for violent offenses such as murder and manslaughter), using a
log transformation would be an inappropriate way to deal with this heteroskedasticity.
Instead, as a sensitivity analysis, I estimate separate regressions for counties in each of
four crime quartiles. To construct the quartiles, I calculate the mean crime rate for to-
tal crimes for each in-sample county, averaging across months and years. I then order
these mean crime rates from highest to lowest. Quartile 1 represents counties below
the 25th percentile; Quartile 2 represents counties between the 25 and 49th percentiles;
Quartile 3 represents counties between the 50 and 74th percentiles; and Quartile 4 rep-
resents counties at or above the 75th percentile.
Figure 2.11 shows the results from this analysis. Generally speaking, the coefficients
from Quartiles 1, 2, and 3 are of similar magnitude. As expected, the coefficients from
regressions using data from Quartile 4 (counties with the highest average crime rate
for all crimes) tend to be larger, although the exact degree of difference varies across
types of crime.
A final question about the analytical approach used in this chapter is whether one
month is a sufficiently long time period to account for any lagged impacts of weather
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(a) Murder (b) Manslaughter (c) Rape
(d) Aggravated Assault (e) Simple Assault (f) Robbery
(g) Burglary (h) Larceny (i) Vehicle Theft
Figure 2.10: Monthly Crime and Daily Temperature, by Mean Monthly Temperature
Note: Each figure shows coefficients from a regression of the monthly crime rate per 100,000 persons on a
semiparametric set of weather bin variables, interacted with three county-month temperature category
variables. These categorical dummy variables indicate whether the average temperature in each month-
by-county, over the period from 1960 to 2009, fell into one of three bins: <45 degrees F, 45 to 69 degrees
F, or ≥70 F. All coefficients are relative to one day in the 60 to 70 degrees F bin.
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(a) Murder (b) Manslaughter (c) Rape
(d) Aggravated Assault (e) Simple Assault (f) Robbery
(g) Burglary (h) Larceny (i) Vehicle Theft
Figure 2.11: Monthly Crime and Daily Temperature, by Crime Rate Quartile
Note: Each figure shows coefficients from regressions of the monthly crime rate per 100,000 persons on
a semiparametric set of weather bin variables, for counties in each of four crime quartiles. To construct
the quartiles, I calculate the mean crime rate for all crimes for each in-sample county, averaging across
months and years. I then order these mean crime rates from highest to lowest. Quartile 1 represents
counties below the 25th percentile; Quartile 2 represents counties between the 25 and 49th percentiles;
Quartile 3 represents counties between the 50 and 74th percentiles; and Quartile 4 represents counties at
or above the 75th percentile. All coefficients are relative to one day in the 60 to 70 degrees F bin.
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on crime. Although the insignificant coefficients on a one-month lag of weather sug-
gest this is the case, I also conduct sensitivity analyses in which I run regressions using
data that have been aggregated to quarterly and half-year time periods. Figure 2.12
shows the results of this analysis. Although regressions results based on more aggre-
gate time periods are noisier than the results based on month-long time periods, the
estimated coefficients from the three types of regressions are generally similar. The
relationship between temperature and crime rates for aggravated and simple assault
appears somewhat weaker based on the quarterly and half-year data. However, the
effect of temperature on burglary and larceny is even stronger in the quarterly and
half-year data. Overall, the figure suggests that a one-month aggregation period is
sufficient to account for most “harvesting” that occurs as a result of negative serial
correlation in crime rates.
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(a) Murder (b) Manslaughter (c) Rape
(d) Aggravated Assault (e) Simple Assault (f) Robbery
(g) Burglary (h) Larceny (i) Vehicle Theft
Figure 2.12: Crime and Daily Temperature, by Month, Quarter, and Half-year
Note: Each figure shows coefficients from regressions of the crime rate per 100,000 persons on a semi-
parametric set of weather bin variables. Separate regression results are reported for crimes and weather
aggregated by month, quarter, and half-year. All coefficients are relative to one day in the 60 to 70
degrees F bin.
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Chapter 3:
Bayesian Updating with Potentially-Biased Evidence:
A Model of Climate Skepticism
3.1 Introduction
The spectrum of public debate about climate change policy includes a substantial mi-
nority of individuals who challenge the scientific basis for global warming. These
“climate skeptics” question whether global temperatures are rising and whether an-
thropogenic greenhouse gas emissions will cause significant changes in temperature.18
Although their claims are often dismissed by the mainstream scientific community,
these skeptics exert considerable influence over public opinion about climate policy. In
a 2011 Pew Research Center poll, 28 percent of a nationally representative sample of
Americans answered “no” when asked, “From what you’ve read and heard, is there
solid evidence that the average temperature on earth has been getting warmer over
the past few decades, or not?” (Pew Research Center, 2011). Such beliefs about cli-
mate science are difficult to reconcile with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s conclusion that “[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now
evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures,
widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level” (IPCC, 2007).
Why do members of the public continue to hold beliefs that blatantly contradict the
“unequivocal” conclusions of scientific experts? In this chapter, I argue that at least
part of this discrepancy can be explained by a rational Bayesian learning process with
three key features. First, individuals initially disagree about a scientific question that
is central to a public policy debate: e.g., whether vaccines cause autism, or whether
global temperatures have increased since the Industrial Revolution. Second, new sci-
entific evidence about the question becomes available over time. Third, there is some
possibility that the new evidence is systematically biased.
The central issue in such a situation arises from the fact that even though individu-
als would genuinely like to learn the true answer to the scientific question, their abil-
ity to learn is limited by the possibility of systematic bias. Although biased evidence
18For example, see www.climate-skeptic.com or www.skepticsglobalwarming.com.
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does provide some information about the underlying scientific question, it is not quite
enough to zero in on the exact answer. To illustrate why this is the case, in this chapter
I develop a simple model of an individual’s beliefs about whether current global tem-
peratures have increased relative to temperatures in the period before the Industrial
Revolution. I model the measured change in temperature as the sum of two random
variables: the true change in temperature, and scientific measurement bias. The indi-
vidual begins with prior beliefs about both the true change in temperature and scien-
tific measurement bias. After receiving new evidence about measured temperature (as
reported by scientists), the individual then updates his beliefs.
In contrast to the usual Bayesian result that beliefs converge over time, I find that in this
simple model, the posterior distributions for true change in temperature and measure-
ment bias depend on the choice of priors, even when the number of observations of
measured change in temperature goes to infinity. From a purely statistical standpoint,
this failure of convergence (due to a flat likelihood function over some combinations
of beliefs) is well-understood.19 In the context of my model, however, lack of identifi-
ability generates two predictions that explain several important features of the current
debate about climate change.
First, when there is any possibility of systematic measurement bias, no amount of new
evidence can reconcile initial differences of opinion about whether global temperatures
have increased. Even if two people who initially disagree about temperature share
the same initial belief that mean measurement error is zero, as long as they admit
some possibility of systematic measurement bias, then they will always interpret new
evidence as supporting different conclusions about the true change in temperature.
This result holds even in the limiting case with an infinite number of new temperature
measurements.
Second, because people who begin with more extreme beliefs about temperature end
up with more extreme beliefs about measurement bias, there is a tendency for the
19See, e.g., Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer (1995), or Feldman (1991).
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model to create “climate skeptics”. Thus, the model suggests that skepticism about
science is a completely rational response to observing a discrepancy between one’s
own prior beliefs and new evidence reported by scientists. Although behavioral biases
may certainly play a role in the phenomenon of climate skepticism, this result contrasts
sharply with the viewpoint that skeptics are being disingenuous when they argue that
the evidence for climate change is overstated.
A natural response to this model is to argue that the main results no longer hold if
individuals can also observe separate evidence about the magnitude of the scientific
bias. In such a situation, rational Bayesian updating will lead individuals to learn the
exact true answer to the scientific question. This is, in some ways, the key policy lesson
to be drawn from this chapter: not only is it important for scientists to communicate
the conclusions of their research, but it is also important for them to describe how
they reached those conclusions. In order to address concerns about potential biases,
the scientific community would be well-served by focusing on improving both the
quantity and transparency of climate research.
This chapter builds on several strands of literature. It is most directly related to a
set of climatology papers that develop Bayesian statistical methods for combining re-
sults from multiple climate proxy records and general circulation models (Tebaldi et al,
2005; Haslett et al, 2006; Li, Nychka, and Ammann, 2010; Smith et al, 2009). A few of
these papers explicitly model measurement bias and the challenge it creates for learn-
ing about future climate (Jun, Knutti, and Nychka, 2008; Buser, Kunsch, and Schar,
2010; Buser, 2009). However, unlike my approach, which takes identifiability as a fun-
damental and unresolvable dilemma, they treat identifiability as a statistical issue to
be addressed through ad hoc assumptions such as imposition of zero-sum bias condi-
tions or informative priors (Buser et al, 2009). Furthermore, these papers can best be
characterized as “models of climate”, not as “models of people’s beliefs about climate”.
A second set of papers explores optimal policy and the dynamics of learning about
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climate change. For example, Weitzman (2009) shows how Bayesian learning in the
presence of stuctural uncertainty about climate sensitivity leads to fat-tailed posterior
distributions for climate damages (see also Pindyck, 2009; Newbold and Daigneault,
2009). Other authors focus on Bayesian learning about climate as part of a sequential
decision making strategy (Hammitt et al, 1992) or optimal control problem (Kelly and
Kolstad, 1999; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Leach, 2007; Karp and Zhang, 2006).
A final set of related papers study whether individuals use a rational Bayesian learn-
ing process (Cyert and DeGroot, 1974; Viscusi and O’Conner, 1984; Viscusi and Zeck-
hauser, 2006; Kelly et al, 2009; Cameron, 2005). These papers identify a variety of
behavioral and psychological inconsistencies (Zimper and Ludwig, 2009). For exam-
ple, people’s beliefs about climate change are affected by political beliefs (Borick and
Rabe, 2010; Hamilton, 2011), ambiguity aversion (Millner, Dietz, and Heal, 2010), cog-
nitive dissonance (Wagner and Zeckhauser, 2011), and recent local weather fluctuta-
tions (Deryugina, 2011; Egan and Mullins, 2010).
Although these behavioral factors undoubtedly influence how individuals learn about
climate science, the model in this chapter is based on a completely rational Bayesian
framework. The purpose of adopting this rationalist approach is twofold. First, by set-
ting aside behavioral explanations, I am able to focus on understanding the influence of
systematic bias on learning about climate change. Although in practice, it is likely that
the results presented in this paper explain only part of the empirical discrepancy be-
tween public beliefs and scientific evidence about climate change, my model nonethe-
less emphasizes the potentially important role of this simple but previously neglected
rational influence on learning. Second, in order to understand competing hypotheses
based on psychological and behavioral explanations, it is important to have a state-
ment of the “correct” baseline rational model. Although my model makes assumptions
that may not perfectly describe the actual human brain’s learning process, this paper
still describes what I believe to be a key qualitative feature of how people learn when
evidence is potentially biased.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the gen-
eral Bayesian logic underlying my argument. Section 3.3 applies this logic to a simple
model of skepticism about climate change. Section 3.4 discusses the findings and con-
cludes.
3.2 General Model
I begin by describing the basic Bayesian logic that leads to the results discussed in
the introduction. Consider a simple abstract model, in which an individual would
like to learn the distribution of some policy-relevant random variable T , e.g., the in-
crease in global temperature since the Industrial Revolution, or the treatment effect of
vaccination on the prevalence of autism. Unfortunately, T is not directly observable.
Instead, the individual observes a series of realizations of a signal Z ≡ Z(T,E) that
is influenced by both the policy-relevant variable T and by some nuisance variable E
that represents systematic measurement error. Like T , the variable E is not directly
observable.
Let the joint distribution of T and E be given by f(T,E; θ), where θ is a vector of
parameters with rank two or greater. Furthermore, suppose that at the beginning of
the model, the individual’s prior beliefs about θ are represented by θ0. The individual
then observes a series of realizations z1, z2, ..., zn of the signal Z. Her problem is to use
this new information to update her beliefs about the joint distribution of T and E.
Now, after observing n realizations of Z, the individual’s posterior beliefs about T and
E are given by θn = θ|θ0, z1, z2, ..., zn. It is straightfoward to construct counterexamples
that show that it is not necessarily true that limn→∞ θn = θ. Why is this the case?
The basic argument is that although Z ≡ Z(T,E) defines a unique mapping from
(T,E) to Z, the reverse is not necessarily true. In fact, in most situations, there will
be an infinite number of possible mappings from Z to (T,E). Thus, even though the
observations z1, z2, ..., zn can be used to estimate the precise distribution of the the
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random variable Z, these data are insufficient to recover the parameter θ that describes
the joint distribution of T and E, or to recover even the marginal distributions of T and
E.
In summary, this model implies that that even after observing an infinite number of
realizations of the signal, two individuals who start with different prior beliefs about
θ will still not agree about the posterior distribution of T . Although the above formu-
lation may seem arbitrary, it captures a central feature of the way that people learn
about scientific debates: individuals may be aware of the general results from recent
scientific studies, but possess little information with which to evaluate their credibility.
This lack of credible information about scientific bias means that people rely heavily
on their own prior judgments when updating their beliefs based on new research.
3.3 Application to Climate Skepticism
3.3.1 Model
The previous section presents a general but informal argument that explains why
Bayesian updating based on potentially-biased evidence cannot completely resolve
prior disagreements. In this section I flesh out the intuition for this result by present-
ing a more detailed model of how an individual learns about climate change science. I
abstract away from the complexities of the climate change debate to a single question:
are current global temperatures higher than temperatures during the pre-Industrial
Revolution period? The challenge that the individual faces is that it is not possible to
observe the true change in global temperature. Instead, the individual observes a set
of measurements of the change in temperature that are provided by the scientific com-
munity. These measurements include two sources of inaccuracy: natural variation in
temperature readings, and scientific measurement error.
The individual’s task is to use this set of observations about measured change in tem-
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perature to update his beliefs about the true change in global temperature. As in the
previous section, I assume a rational Bayesian updating process, in which the indi-
vidual begins with prior distributions for the true change in global temperature and
scientific measurement error, and then calculates posterior distributions using a com-
bination of these prior beliefs and the new evidence, following Bayes’ Rule.
Unlike other papers on expert opinion (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Battaglini, 2004;
Krishna and Morgan, 2001), I do not explicitly model the incentives of the scientific
community. Instead, I assume—perhaps unrealistically—that scientists do their best
to provide unbiased estimates of the change in global temperatures. However, by
including scientific measurement error in the model, I still allow for the possibility
that scientists unintentionally reported biased estimates. Such bias could have a va-
riety of causes, e.g., flawed methodologies, publication bias, or reliance by different
researchers on the same underlying sets of data (Jun, Knutti, and Nychka, 2008).
More formally, let Z be a random variable that represents the measured change in
global temperature. This variable is defined as the sum of two other random variables:
the true change in global temperature T , and scientific measurement error E.
Z ≡ T + E (3.1)
I model the true change in temperature T as a random variable in order to include
uncertainty caused by natural stochasticity in climate. For simplicity, I assume T to be
normally distributed:
T ∼ N(τ, φ2) (3.2)
where the mean change in temperature τ is the parameter that scientists and the gen-
eral public would like to learn, and the variance φ2 can be interpreted as natural sam-
pling variation (e.g., zero-mean differences caused by measuring temperatures in a
range of geographic locations).
Similarly, I assume that the systematic measurement error variable E is also normally
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distributed:
E ∼ N(, ν2) (3.3)
where  is the mean measurement bias, and the variance ν2 captures additional zero-
mean noise attributable to the scientific measurement process. For example, a positive
value of  might mean that all temperature records based on tree ring cores system-
atically overestimate the actual change in temperature that has occurred over the last
several centuries, and a positive value of ν2 might indicate that variation in growth
patterns across trees introduces additional (zero-mean) measurement error.
Let f(z|τ, ) denote the probability densitity function for Z, where the variance param-
eters φ and ν are supressed for notational convience. Using the standard result that
the sum of two normal random variables is itself normally distributed, equation (3.1)
implies that the distribution for Z is:
Z ∼ N(τ + , φ2 + ν2) (3.4)
Note that this formulation allows for real bias, in the sense that when  is non-zero,
observations of Z will be consistently higher or lower than T .
The timing of the model is as follows. Each period s, scientists draw a single realiza-
tion zs from Z, the random variable representing measured change in temperature. As
indicated by Equation 3.1, this realization is itself based on the sum of (unobserved)
realizations ts and es of the random variables T andE. Scientists then report this obser-
vation zs to the general public. Each member of the public then uses this new informa-
tion to update his or her beliefs about the true change in temperature and systematic
measurement bias.
As is typical in models of Bayesian updating, I assume that individuals do not know
the parameters τ and  that describe mean true change in temperature and mean sys-
tematic measurement bias (although I do assume that the variance parameters φ2 and
ν2 are known).20 Instead, in period 0, before observing any data, each individual uses
20Because φ2 and ν2 both represent zero-mean noise, these variance parameters have no effect on the
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her prior knowledge (based, for example, on theoretical calculations, or anything else)
to generate probability density functions that represents her beliefs about the possible
range of values that these two parameters might take:
g0(τ) ∼ N(τ0, σ20) (3.5)
h0() ∼ N(0, ω20) (3.6)
For example, gs(τ) describes an individual’s prior beliefs about the parameter τ , and
hs() describes an individual’s prior beliefs about the parameter , based on all infor-
mation that has been accumlated as of time s. After observing the new temperature
measurement zs+1, the individual uses a Bayesian updating process to generate new
posterior parameter values τs+1, σ2s+1, s+1, and ω2s+1 that better represent her beliefs
about τ and , based on the new information contained in zs+1.
3.3.2 Results
In this section I present the main analytical results. I begin by deriving the posterior
distributions for the true change in temperature and for measurement error, after the
individual observes n observations {z1, z2, ..., zn} of the measured change in tempera-
ture. These observations can be envisioned as distinct pieces of evidence provided by
scientists.
Theorem 3. After observing n observations {z1, z2, ..., zn}, the posterior distribution for τ is:
τ |z1, ..., zn, τ0, σ0, 0, ω0 ∼ N(τn, σ2n) (3.7)
where:
τn ≡ (nω
2
0 + φ
2 + ν2)τ0 + σ
2
0
∑n
i=1(zi − 0)
nω20 + φ
2 + ν2 + nσ20
(3.8)
and:
1
σ2n
≡ n
nω20 + φ
2 + ν2
+
1
σ20
(3.9)
overall results as the number of temperature observations becomes large.
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Furthermore, the posterior distribution for  is:
|z1, ..., zn, τ0, σ0, 0, ω0 ∼ N(n, ω2n) (3.10)
where:
n ≡ (φ
2 + ν2 + nσ20)0 + ω
2
0
∑n
i=1(zi − τ0)
nω20 + φ
2 + ν2 + nσ20
(3.11)
and:
1
ω2n
≡ 1
ω20
+
n
φ2 + ν2 + nσ20
(3.12)
Proof. See Appendix I.
Now suppose that n→∞, so that the individual observes a (nearly) unlimited number
of measurements of the change in temperature. The limiting posterior distributions for
τ and  are given by Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Let τ ∗ and ∗ denote the true population means for τ and . As the number of
observations n approaches infinity, the limiting posterior distribution for τ is:
lim
n→∞
τ |z1, ..., zn, τ0, σ0, 0, ω0 ∼ N(τ˜ , σ˜2) (3.13)
where:
τ˜ ≡ ω
2
0τ0 + σ
2
0(τ
∗ + ∗ − 0)
ω20 + σ
2
0
(3.14)
and:
1
σ˜2
≡ 1
ω20
+
1
σ20
(3.15)
Furthermore, the limiting posterior distribution for  is:
lim
n→∞
|z1, ..., zn, τ0, σ0, 0, ω0 ∼ N(˜, ω˜2) (3.16)
where:
˜ ≡ σ
2
00 + ω
2
0(τ
∗ + ∗ − τ0)
ω20 + σ
2
0
(3.17)
and:
1
ω˜2
≡ 1
ω20
+
1
σ20
(3.18)
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Proof. Equation (3.14) follows from equation (3.8) by applying l’Hopital’s rule to the
linear terms and applying the law of large numbers and the relationship from equation
(3.4) to the sum
∑n
i=1 zi. Similarly, equation (3.15) follows from applying l’Hopital’s
rule to equation (3.9). Finally, convergence in equations (3.14) and (3.15) implies that
limn→∞ τ |z1, ..., zn, τ0, 0 converges toN(τ˜ , σ˜2), as in equation (3.13). The proof for equa-
tions (3.16), (3.17), and (3.18) follows by symmetry.
As a first step towards understanding these formulas, it is worth noting that neither φ2
nor ν2 appear in any of the equations. Intuitively, this is because both of these variance
parameters represent zero-mean Gaussian noise that does not matter when the sample
size becomes large enough (due to the Law of Large Numbers).
It is now informative to conduct comparative statics. Consider first the reference case
where 0 = 0 and ω20 = 0. This is the standard Bayesian model with no measurement
error. In this case, τ˜ = τ ∗ and σ˜2 = 0, and the individual’s posterior distribution for the
true change in temperature approaches the actual population distribution.
Now suppose instead that 0 takes some non-zero value but ω20 → 0. Once again,
τ˜ → τ ∗ and σ˜2 → 0. The intuition for this result is that when the bias is perfectly
known, it can simply be subtracted and then ignored.
Next, consider the case where 0 and ω20 are both non-zero, but σ20 → 0. The result
is that τ˜ → τ0 and σ˜2 → 0. Since the individual believes that his prior estimate τ0 is
exactly correct, there is no need to update based on new evidence.
If all of the parameters take non-zero values, then τ˜ takes a value that is a weighted
average of the prior mean τ0 and the sample mean net of the prior measurement error,
where the weights are determined by the precisions of the prior distributions. Be-
cause no information is available that can completely resolve the uncertainty about the
amount of measurement bias, the variance σ˜2 does not go to zero.
The most interesting case, however, is when 0 is zero but ω20 takes a positive value.
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Surprisingly, even when ∗ = 0, the result is that τ˜ → ω20τ0+σ20τ∗
ω20+σ
2
0
and ˜→ ω20(τ∗−τ0))
ω20+σ
2
0
. This
is the key result of this chapter. The inuition is that as long as ω20 is non-zero, there is
some possibility of systematic measurement error. Thus, even when 0 = 0 and ∗ = 0,
a rational Bayesian updater who observes a discrepancy between his prior belief about
the true change in temperature (τ0) and his asymptotically correct estimate of the mean
of the measured change in temperature (zn → τ ∗) will attribute some of that difference
to measurement error. Thus, an individual whose initial beliefs satisfy τ0 < τ ∗ and
0 = 
∗ = 0 will always arrive at posterior beliefs that underestimate the true change in
temperature and overestimate the amount of systematic measurement error.
3.4 Discussion
The value of the simple model presented in this chapter lies in the fact that despite
a parsimonious specification, the model generates two somewhat surprising insights
into climate change skepticism (and more broadly, into skepticism about other scien-
tific debates). Both of these results arise from the fact that when there is any possibil-
ity of systematic scientific measurement bias, the posterior distributions for the true
change in temperature and measurement bias remain dependent on the choice of pri-
ors even as the number of measured temperature observations goes to infinity.
First, when there is any possibility of systematic measurement bias, no amount of new
evidence can reconcile initial differences of opinion about whether global temperatures
have increased. As long as ω20 and σ20 are non-zero, two individuals with different prior
beliefs about temperature will arrive at different posterior beliefs about temperature.
This is true even if both individuals start with the same prior beliefs about measure-
ment bias—and furthermore, even if both individuals start with the same prior belief
that mean measurement bias is zero.
Second, there is a natural tendency for people who begin with more extreme beliefs
about temperature to end up with more extreme beliefs about measurement bias.
117
Again, as long as there is some possibility of systematic measurement bias (in the sense
that ω20 is non-zero), this result holds even if those individuals share the same prior be-
lief that the mean of measurement bias is zero. The intuition for this result is that an
individual whose prior beliefs about temperature are further from the true population
mean always attributes a greater quantity of the discrepancy between his initial beliefs
and the temperature measurements to measurement error. This contrasts sharply with
the viewpoint that climate skeptics are being disingenuous when they argue that the
evidence for climate change is overstated. Instead, it suggests that skepticism about
science is a completely rational response to observing a discrepancy between one’s
own prior beliefs and new evidence reported by scientists.
Although the results presented in this chapter are based on a specific functional form
in which systematic bias enters as an additive component of the observed tempera-
ture signal, the results can be generalized to other types of models. For example, a
“mixture distribution” version of the model, in which individuals update their beliefs
based on the likelihood of observing different signals, produces similar qualitative re-
sults.21 In this alternative model, scientists again make a series of measurements of the
change in global temperatures since the beginning of the industrial revolution. How-
ever, there is some probability that their scientific methodology is simply wrong, e.g.,
because some factor such as widespread plant disease causes the historical relationship
between temperatures and tree ring growth to be very different from what it is today.
I model this uncertainty by assuming that with probability P scientists observe mea-
surements from the true temperature record, and with probability 1 − P they observe
meaningless noise. These probabilities represent a one-time draw, so that if scientists
start out observing the true temperature record, then they will always observe the true
temperature record, and vice versa.
In such a model, individuals have prior beliefs about the distribution of signals (i.e.,
21Complete results are available from the author upon request. I plan to explore these models in more
detail in future research.
118
measurements of historical temperatures) that would be observed from each of these
two types of data generating processes. Their problem is to use the signals to update
both their beliefs about which signal they are observing (the true record or meaningless
noise) as well as their beliefs about what the actual change in historical temperatures
has been. Although I do not present the mathematical details here, the basic qualitative
result is similar: an individual’s prior beliefs always influence her posterior beliefs,
even as the number of temperature measurements goes to infinity.
3.5 Conclusion
What are the policy implications of the somewhat gloomy results presented in this
chapter? One interpretation is that policy makers should not expect future scientific re-
search to build a public consensus for action on climate change.22 Although the model
does suggest that additional research will bring beliefs closer together, it cannot com-
pletely bridge the divide between people who begin with very different initial beliefs
about rising temperatures. Thus, policy makers will have to resort to more traditional
political tools—such as strong leadership and emotional appeals—to generate public
support for appropriate climate actions.
A second, more positive, interpretation is that science has great potential for helping to
inform the public’s opinions about climate change. However, the model strongly sug-
gests that only reporting the results from additional scientific studies may not be very
useful. Instead, reporting these results is most valuable when scientists also make an
effort to communicate information about the quality of their research, so that individu-
als can make informed decisions about scientific bias. The central obstacle to achieving
consensus is that people are unsure whether they can trust climate science. If this ob-
stacle were removed—by making data, methodologies, and results more available to
the public in a non-technical form that encourages critical thinking and discussion—it
22Survey evidence suggests that people who distrust scientists are less likely to believe that climate
change is real (Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz, 2008).
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seems likely that at least some doubts about scientific bias could be eliminated and that
public opinions about climate change might converge.
As dicussed in the introduction, a great deal of evidence suggests that people are at
best imperfect Bayesians. Thus, a reasonable objection to this chapter is to say that
the Bayesian model of belief formation is not descriptively accurate. I acknowledge
that this criticism has empirical strength: beliefs about climate change are influenced
by political affiliations, cognitive dissonance, recent weather conditions, and other
“non-Bayesian” factors (Borick and Rabe, 2010; Wagner and Zeckhauser, 2011; Deryug-
ina, 2011). Yet, unlike more complicated models, I argue that the basic application of
Bayesian decision theory presented here produces a simple and practically useful pre-
scription: make science more transparent.
3.6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. Consider first the posterior distribution for the temperature parameter τ . After
observing the n observations z1, z2, ..., zn, the new posterior distribution for τ is:
g(τ |z1, z2, ..., zn, τ0, σ0, 0, ω0) =
(∫∞
=−∞ (
∏n
i=1 f(zi|τ, ))h0()d
)
g0(τ)∫∞
τ=−∞
(∫∞
=−∞ (
∏n
i=1 f(zi|τ, ))h0()d
)
g0(τ)dτ
(3.19)
This can be rewritten in Bayesian notation by substituting the formula for the normal
distribution and then dropping normalizing constants:
g(τ |z1, z2, ..., zn, τ0, σ0, 0, ω0) ∝∫∞
=−∞
(∏n
i=1 exp
(
−(zi−(τ+))2
2(φ2+ν2)
))
exp
(
−(−0)2
2ω20
)
d · exp
(
−(τ−τ0)2
2σ20
)
(3.20)
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Applying some algebra shows that:
g(τ |z1, z2, ..., zn, τ0, σ0, 0, ω0) ∝∫∞
=−∞ exp
(
nω20
2+(φ2+ν2)2−2ω20(
∑n
i=1(zi−τ))−2(φ2+ν2)0+ω20
∑n
i=1(zi−τ)2+(φ2+ν2)20
−2(φ2+ν2)ω20
)
d ·
exp
(
−(τ−τ0)2
2σ20
)
(3.21)
Now, by completing the square in , moving terms that contain τ outside of the integral,
and dropping normalizing constants, the result is:
g(τ |z1, z2, ..., zn, τ0, σ0, 0, ω0) ∝∫∞
=−∞ exp
(−ω20(∑ni=1(zi−τ))+(φ2+ν2)0nω20+φ2+ν2 )2−2ω20(φ2+ν2)/(nω20+φ2+ν2)
 d ·
exp
(−ω40(σn1=1(zi−τ))2−2ω20(φ2+ν2)0∑ni=1(zi−τ)+nω40∑ni=1(zi−τ)2+ω20(φ2+ν2)∑ni=1(zi−τ)2(nω20+φ2+ν2)2 )−2ω20(φ2+ν2)/(nω20+φ2+ν2)
 ·
exp
(
−(τ−τ0)2
2σ20
)
(3.22)
Since the integrand is the probability density function of a normal distribution with
mean ω
2
0
∑n
i=1(zi−τ)+(φ2+ν2)0
nω20+φ
2+ν2
and variance ω
2
0(φ
2+ν2)
nω20+φ
2+ν2
, the integral evaluates to one. After
combining the exponents and then writing out and combining the terms that contain
τ , the equation simplifies to:
g(τ |z1, z2, ..., zn, τ0, σ0, 0, ω0) ∼ exp
−
(
τ − (nω20+φ2+ν2)τ0+σ20
∑
(zi−0)
nω20+φ
2+ν2+nσ20
)
2
(
(nω20+φ
2+ν2)σ20
nω20+φ
2+ν2+nσ20
)
 (3.23)
This posterior distribution can be rewritten as the normal density function described
in equations (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9).
By symmetry of the problem in τ and , the proof for equations (3.10), (3.11), and (3.12)
follows the same steps as above.
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